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Chapter One: An Introduction to Airpower in American Foreign Policy 
Airpower has a seductive nature to it.1 Technology promises to be able to destroy 
or seriously damage an enemy military’s capabilities without serious risk to American 
forces. Moreover, these knights of the sky have an aura of power with the ability to 
destroy important pieces of military equipment or infrastructure. Airpower may seem like 
a niche topic of international relations or American foreign policy, but it represents the 
opening move of war. Gaining air superiority is the first step in any American 
engagement as it allows the rest of American military might to be brought to bear. It is 
also a selective form of engagement. It allows the United States, or any nation-state, to 
attack only a limited part of an enemy state. It represents the option to engage in a limited 
war or the opening salvo of a war among major powers. Because it represents an 
attractive form of intervention, particularly from an American perspective, it needs 
thorough examination. Any use of American military force has the potential to drastically 
alter the international arena, so its use ought to be part of a carefully examined strategy 
that does not merely rely on the destructive power of bombs or cruise missiles.  
Airpower has gained a heightened importance with the campaign against the self-
proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, as well as, President Trump’s recent 
authorization of a cruise missile strike on Shayrat Airfield in Syria in response to the 
reported chemical attack on civilians in Khan Sheikoun. The use of airpower could 
further muddle an already unclear and tense geopolitical situation in Syria, or it could be 
                                                 
1 Pape, Robert A. "The True Worth of Air Power." Foreign Affairs 83.2 (2004): 116. Web. 
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a footnote. Regardless, it will change America’s commitments abroad and alter the 
landscape of international relations. 
How effective has airpower been as a tool in American foreign policy and what 
strategy needs to accompany airpower to make it an effective tool? To address this 
question, I divide the paper into thematic chapters that examine unique conflicts. First I 
examine and debate the usefulness of drone strikes in North Waziristan against al-Qaeda. 
Then, I look at the opening months of the War in Afghanistan and the strategic value of 
the Afghan Model. In the third chapter, I compare how airpower was used against 
Milosevic in Serbia and Qaddafi in Libya. 
For this project, I primarily utilize academic articles to compare arguments about 
the use of airpower. I use these academic pieces of writing to compare differing 
perspectives on the debate around the usefulness of airpower as a military strategy. This 
alone, though, cannot provide a basis for a conclusion, so I also point to first-hand 
accounts of events that make salient points about airpower. I also turn to official military 
histories or commissioned studies for history and context about each case. These official 
histories also frequently provided anecdotal evidence that could also further prove or 
disprove claims made in the academic literature. For broader theoretical work, several 
books that are discussed in the chapters discuss the history of airpower theory and 
military strategy. As this is focused on international relations, there is also a place for 
theoretical works on the three primary paradigms: realism, liberalism, and 
constructivism. Airpower can only effectively be wielded by states, so it is important to 
have a general understanding of the international system. After all, war is politics by 
other means. 
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Drone War in North Waziristan 
Drone strikes are controversial because of the legal, moral, and humanitarian 
implications of using military force via remote satellite uplink. While these are important 
issues, they fall outside the purview of this thesis. Instead, I focus on the strategy of the 
use of drones to fight al-Qaeda and other terror groups in this politically isolated region. 
Dealing with these groups in this semi-autonomous province in the northwest of Pakistan 
is a politically toxic proposition. Al-Qaeda and their associates operate within and among 
civilians in these areas, so conventional military options are off the table. Special forces 
raids risk upsetting the political status quo within Pakistan. They also risk tying civilian 
casualties directly to American forces. Air strikes from conventional manned aircraft lack 
any plausible deniability, the ability to discriminate as their loiter times are limited, and 
their weapons are not suited for the mission. Artillery strikes are also out of the question 
as they are meant to destroy targets over a wide area, not discriminately attack 
individuals. It is a unique military problem created by a unique political situation. 
Pakistan believes that these groups have strategic value to them in their regional power 
struggle against India, yet the Pakistani military needs American support as well. 
In this chapter I examine the roots of the drone program, which began as a 
surveillance project envisioned to give the United States military total situational 
awareness on the battlefield as part of the “Revolution in Military Affairs”. Initially, it 
appeared that the technical challenges of operating an unmanned aerial vehicle would be 
impossible, but advances in satellite technology and the Global Positioning System 
combined with the design of Avraheem Karem at General Atomics provided a working 
model, which comes to be the recognizable RQ-1 Predator. 
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The program was forever altered when a drone spotted someone who matched the 
profile and behavior of Osama bin-Laden in Afghanistan in 2000. The Predator, which 
was unarmed, could only watch as the suspected bin-Laden slipped away. This event 
served as a watershed moment because it marked the decision to arm the Predator, 
primarily with the AGM-114 Hellfire, an anti-tank missile. Designed to hit vehicles, it is 
well suited for use in urban settings, as it does not have a massive blast. Also, it is 
reasonable to point to this moment as the start of “signature strikes”. Signature strikes 
target the characteristics and behaviors of terror networks as opposed to acting solely on 
intelligence.  
After the Taliban and al-Qaeda were chased from Afghanistan, they took refuge 
in the autonomous tribal regions of Pakistan. This represented an issue as al-Qaeda could 
regroup and plan attacks against American and Western targets. Obviously, this would be 
unacceptable given that it would render the invasion of Afghanistan an exercise in 
futility. To reiterate, the use of conventional airpower was out of the question, as was 
artillery or special forces. Drones, with advanced cameras and the ability to loiter for 
dozens of hours gave the intelligence and military services an opportunity to observe a 
target and pick the opportune time to strike. There are two schools of thought that vary 
greatly on the strategic value and usefulness of the drone strikes.  
Proponents, such as Daniel Byman, see drone strikes as the best solution to a 
problem without a good solution. 2 Drones, according to this line of thought, are more 
precise and discriminating than the other options. Also, they force al-Qaeda into hiding 
                                                 
2 Byman, Daniel. "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice. “Foreign 
Affairs (2013): n. pag. Print. 
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and limit their communications ability to strategize about the war in Afghanistan and plan 
terror attacks. When a strike eliminates a member, it also reduces their future 
functionality as an organization. When a leader is eliminated, it can reduce the prestige of 
the group and harm future recruiting ability. 
Conversely, Bergen and Tiedemann argue that strikes undermine American 
strategic interests because they stoke anger and recruitment to terror groups. 3 Also, they 
argue that forcing leaders to abandon electronic communication and withdraw further 
makes it harder to target these leaders for kill or capture missions. These two theories on 
drone strikes are irreconcilable and represent the problem with the current discourse. It 
does not formulate a comprehensive strategy to solve a problem. It relies on technology 
to win on its own, which is impossible. 
Drones are a novel piece of hardware and they are not well understood as tools of 
foreign policy. To gain broader perspective on how drones have been used and how they 
can be used more effectively, I examine which category of airpower the drone campaign 
fits into, according to Robert Pape. 4 The categories themselves will be discussed in-
depth in the chapter, but I argue that the strikes embody part of the denial and 
decapitation categories. Drones target leadership elements and attempt to decapitate 
them, but these opportunities are rare and these groups do not wither and die when a 
leader is eliminated. Al-Qaeda did not collapse when bin-Laden was killed. In terms of 
denial, it prohibits the ability to conduct a military campaign because it restricts 
                                                 
3 Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. "Washington's Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone 
Program in Pakistan." Foreign Affairs 90.4 (2011): 12-18. Web. 
4 Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1995. Print. 
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movement. I propose that the drone campaign should undertake a hybrid campaign that 
targets leadership when the opportunity presents itself, but attacking mid-level fighters 
and commanders are the lynchpins of the organization because they carry out the political 
vision of the organization and if they are eliminated, then the group’s capacity for 
violence is reduced. 
Finally, I discuss the recently declassified document that outlines the Obama 
Administration’s guidelines for authorizing a strike. I compare how this document fits in 
with my proposed strategic vision. I also discuss under what circumstances drone strikes 
would be effective. 
Operation Enduring Freedom 
The opening attacks of the War in Afghanistan have been hailed as a victory for 
airpower. Some have argued that the Afghan Model can completely change the way 
American foreign policy can be conducted because it relies on few American troops, 
airpower and indigenous allies. It is easy to look at how quickly the addition of American 
airpower and special forces were able to break the stalemate between the Northern 
Alliance and the Taliban and claim that this model could reshape the way foreign policy 
could be conducted. I argue that the Afghan Model has a certain range of adversaries it 
would be useful against low to middle tier conventional adversaries. The Afghan Model 
was much more successful against the Taliban when in conventional situations, but faced 
difficulties against al-Qaeda forces when they adopted insurgency tactics.  
The decision to use airpower combined with special forces and indigenous allies 
was greatly influenced by the geostrategic circumstances that surrounded the war. This is 
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important to understand if one wants to evaluate the broader applicability of the Afghan 
Model. Afghanistan is a landlocked country, so the United States would need to secure 
overflight and basing rights in the region. Afghanistan has Iran to the west, former Soviet 
satellite states to the north, and Pakistan to the east. Each presented their own diplomatic 
problems. It would also mean that building up large mechanized and infantry forces 
would take a considerable amount of time and the desire to hit back after 9/11 made this 
option undesirable. These diplomatic and logistical problems set the stage to solve the 
problem with airpower, but given the unique circumstances that surrounded the conflict, 
it shows that the Afghan Model is not readily replicable. 
The Taliban and al-Qaeda perspective on potential American military 
involvement is also important to comprehend because the Afghan Model is a counter-
strategy to their plan to hold onto Afghanistan and make it the graveyard of empires. 
They believed that the US military would respond with overwhelming numbers of troops 
as the Soviets did and they could use a similar strategy as they did in that war and slowly 
bleed out the Americans. They did not foresee the American urgency to strike back in 
retaliation would give rise to the Afghan Model. 
Then, I use anecdotal evidence and official accounts of the War in Afghanistan to 
demonstrate the different situations the use of airpower encountered in the opening 
months of the war. I discuss the weaknesses of the Model that were on display at the 
Battle of Tora Bora because it depends on allies, who often do not share the same 
political views and objectives as the US. Despite the full availability of the United States 
Air Force, bin Laden was able to slip away because of differences of opinion within the 
tribal groups and the dearth of American or allied troops on the ground. I also argue that 
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this represented a situation more akin of an insurgency, which is one reason why 
conventional military force was ill-suited for the situation. Consequently, I point to this 
as one of the reasons that the Afghan Model is better suited against low-to-middle tier 
conventional adversaries. 
The capabilities and the usefulness of the Afghan Model in certain situations and 
against a limited set of adversaries were on display in the battle of Mazar e Sharif. It 
showed that allies who share the same strategic vision in a conventional conflict are much 
more likely to succeed. Moreover, it could take advantage of the synergy between ground 
and air forces because the political landscape was clear and the battlefield was well 
understood.  
Then I discuss the predominant opinions about the applicability of the Afghan 
Model. Some, like Andres, Wills, and Griffith argue that it has wide applicability and can 
reshape American foreign policy. They argue this because of the tactical conundrum that 
airpower poses for enemy forces and how powerful the synergy between ground and air 
is. On the other hand, Stephen Biddle argues that the Afghan Model has limited 
applicability and does not represent a new version of American foreign policy because it 
relies on allies. While I agree with Biddle on this matter, I contribute that the Afghan 
Model can be extremely effective, but only in a limited range of conflict types and 
intensities. Taking territory was the easier part of the war, but expecting a handful of 
special forces soldiers to take territory and build a political consensus in a nation of 
fragmented ethnic groups with their own political agendas was expecting too much. Once 
the Taliban and al-Qaeda turned to an insurgency strategy, airpower and special forces 
are much less effective. It is not a paradigm altering method of fighting war. 
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Operation Allied Force and Operation Odyssey Dawn 
One of the most contested uses of airpower was the 1999 campaign in Kosovo 
with the directive to protect Kosovar Albanians from the Milosevic regime. There is wide 
disagreement among scholars about what exactly caused Milosevic to capitulate. Some 
argue that the threat of a US/NATO invasion was the coercive mechanism, while others 
point to the collapse of Russian diplomatic support, and still other scholars claim that 
airpower caused Milosevic to collapse. There are reasonable arguments for each, but I 
argue that airpower changed the political reality for Milosevic and forced him to alter his 
behavior. I do not claim that these actions were taken because of humanitarian norms, but 
rather because it represented an opportunity for the US to reshape regional political order 
and ensure stability in important regions. 
Airpower offers a way for the US to shape regional order and international affairs 
without exposing itself to the uncertainties of war. There is no consensus about how 
effective airpower was at coercing Milosevic, but when one compares the situations 
surrounding the campaigns in Kosovo and Libya, more truths about airpower become 
evident. I solidify this argument and discuss airpower as a strategy on a broader level by 
comparing Operation Allied Force to Operation Odyssey Dawn in 2011 in Libya. I do 
this because Milosevic and Qaddafi had similar regime types. They were both soft 
authoritarian regimes that used patronage systems and the military to legitimize their rule. 
In each case, airpower was a counterstrategy, so it is necessary to understand the 
origins of the conflicts. I discuss the origins of the Kosovo conflict and examine the 
Serbian strategy, as it is necessary to view airpower to counter ethnic cleansing. Then I 
evaluate the arguments from each perspective on the effectiveness of airpower in 
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Kosovo. I do not argue that in Kosovo airpower alone forced Milosevic to capitulate, but 
rather it changed his political calculus. His military forces were dispersed and hidden 
because it does not require heavy forces to conduct ethnic cleansing. The campaign 
switched from targeting the Serbian military to mixed use economic facilities, which 
effected Milosevic’s political base and thus destabilize his hold on power. Airpower 
created a situation where his hold on power was no longer tenable. 
On the other side, some like Conrad Crane argue that airpower did not change 
Milosevic’s mind, even though mixed-use facilities were hit. Instead, he and others argue 
that the threat of US/NATO ground invasion and the collapse of Russian diplomatic 
support was what hanged Milosevic’s mind about continuing his actions. 
It is reasonable to compare Kosovo with Libya because they were similar regime 
types that were targeted because of actions that can be categorized with targeted killing 
on political adversaries. In Kosovo, it was along ethnic lines and in Libya it was 
opposition political groups. Both cases though represent an effort to solidify their own 
political position as Milosevic would further solidify support among Serbian nationalist 
groups for reclaiming the province hailed as the cradle of Serbian civilization. Qaddafi, if 
he were successful, would have remained the sole possessor of political power in Libya. I 
do not claim that these actions were taken because of humanitarian norms, but rather 
because it was an opportunity to reshape regional order. The US targeted Qaddafi’s 
military because that was his primary way to legitimize his authority and without the 
military there was a viable political alternative to his rule. This was the same mechanism 
of political destabilization that was used to undercut Milosevic and given that both 
regimes eventually fell, I argue that airpower had limited success.  
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In neither case did airpower “win” by itself, but it created a situation where each 
leader’s political reality, meaning their ability to effectively lead, control political 
behavior in their counties, achieve specific policy goals, or maintain sovereignty, was 
altered and produced the desired outcome that they were replaced. The ongoing 
instability in Libya and the consequences of the use of airpower go beyond this paper, but 
I do briefly mention it. 
Chapter Two: The Drone War in Pakistan 
Technology has always played a role in shaping the course of conflict; be it the 
advent of the muzzle loading rifle or the steam engine. War and conflict in the 21st 
century is dependent upon technology and the use of armed drones is a prime example. 
Airpower has become an integral part of strategic thinking. This shift is evident in the use 
of armed drones, or remotely piloted aircraft, in the Global War on Terror. In this paper, 
the Global War on Terror is not a term used to denote the specific Bush or Obama 
Administrations’ military actions, but rather to define the broader effort to combat 
terrorism. The policy of using drones to attack al-Qaeda targets in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Area (FATA) region of Pakistan has become the primary way the 
United States fights this group. Drones, and airpower as a strategy, are extremely 
attractive because they advertise unparcelled precision without any risk to oneself, but 
placing faith in them to singlehandedly defeat al-Qaeda is misplaced. Airpower in 
general, and drones specifically, cannot coerce an adversary by themselves. They must be 
part of a comprehensive strategy in combination with political pressure and a force on the 
ground. This force does not necessarily need to be troops. I propose an intelligence 
network, but it could also be a political change. Drones can be used to weaken al-Qaeda, 
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but expecting a relatively few missiles to bring an ideological group to their knees is a 
folly. 
In this chapter I will provide a brief history of the drone program and how it 
evolved from a failing battlefield surveillance concept to the cornerstone of 
counterterrorism strategy. 
Then I will discuss the competing perspectives on the drone program. The 
competing claims hinge on what effect civilian casualties have on al-Qaeda. Some, like 
Byman5, argue that the drone program is the best of only bad options. Some in this camp, 
like Fair, question the reports and polling of anti-American sentiment.6 On the flip side, 
Tiedemann and Bergen argue that drone strikes only stoke anger and push recruits to 
terror organizations like al-Qaeda and they are ineffective at fundamentally undermining 
al-Qaeda. 7 Technology has outpaced traditional thinking in nearly every aspect of 
politics, not just strategy. The key question is this, is there a way to use drone strikes that 
wither terror groups’ strength while avoiding the creation of such anti-American hostility 
that more people are willing to take up arms against the United States? I examine the 
statistical analysis that Walsh8 and Jordan9 present and argue that drone strikes are worth 
the risks in clearly defined circumstances. Clearly, each side has a coherent argument 
                                                 
5 Byman, Daniel. "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice." Foreign 
Affairs (2013): n. pag. Print. 
6 Fair, Christine. "The Drone Papers: Intercepting the Nonsense." Lawfare (n.d.): n. pag. Brookings 
Institute. Web. 
7Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. "Washington's Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone 
Program in Pakistan." Foreign Affairs 90.4 (2011): 12-18. Web. 
Bergen, Peter L., and Jennifer Rowland. "Decade of the Drone." Drone Wars(n.d.): 12-41. Web. 
8 Walsh, James Igoe. "The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism 
Campaigns." Strategic Studies Institute (2013): n. pag. United States Army War College Press. Web. 
9 Jordan, Jenna. "Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark." International Security 38.4 (2014): 7-38. Web. 
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because there are people who have been infuriated by American drone strike, but the 
strikes have killed senior members like Mullah Mohammad Akhtar Manour, who was the 
emir of the Taliban and “commander of the faithful”.10 He replaced Mullah Omar and 
accepted al Qaeda’s oath of allegiance.  
My contribution will attempt to describe a feasible strategy that attempts to avoid 
collateral damage, while maintaining an aggressive posture that keeps the lynchpins of 
terror groups incapable of planning major attacks. I propose the most likely strategy to 
succeed is one that targets leadership only. I define leadership as a person who has forces 
under their control, a key bureaucrat, or charismatic figures. These strikes should also be 
more transparent, to legitimately challenge accusations of civilian death. Only using 
drones to carry this out will likely fail because it does not have synergy to exploit. A 
developed intelligence network will be able to better identify targets, like leaders or other 
lawful targets. I will compare my proposal against the recently released “playbook” for 
drone strike authorization under the Obama Administration. Drones are impressive pieces 
of equipment, so what strategy aimed at defeating al-Qaeda properly utilizes their 
strengths? 
Theoretical Overview 
The use of drones in the War on Terror, specifically in the FATA region of 
Pakistan, has been one of the most controversial uses of airpower. Those opposed argue 
that it lowers the threshold of conflict and ignores international law. Proponents point to 
                                                 
10 Roggio, Bill. "US Strikes in Pakistan, HVTs | FDD's Long War Journal." FDD's Long War Journal. N.p., 
n.d. Web. 13 Dec. 2016. 
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the precision capability to deny safe havens to terror groups.11 It is controversial on a 
moral level as society deals with automation and the increased capabilities of technology 
in the world, but that stems from the question if their use is an effective strategy in the 
fight against al-Qaeda (AQ). Remotely piloted aircraft, like the RQ-1 Predator and RQ-9 
Reaper, can go places too dull, dirty or dangerous for a manned aircraft.12 Small wars and 
insurgencies have replaced the great power conflicts of the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Forces like Al-Qaeda do not wear uniforms or have easily discernible supply lines that 
can be identified and targeted through conventional means. Instead, they are a network 
that operates within and among a society, so it can often be impossible to differentiate 
civilian and militant. Remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) are advertised as a platform that 
offer the endurance to loiter over a target to gather information about an area and people 
of interest, with the sensors to give decision makers a clear picture of what is happening 
without putting Americans in harm’s way, and then weapons precise enough to kill only 
the intended target. As Cockburn puts it drones represent the “unswerving faith that the 
vagaries of human conflict can be overcome by technology.”13 A comprehensive strategy 
for the use of drones and another element on the ground is necessary to create synergy 
between ground and air forces that drones can exploit. 
                                                 
11 Fuller, Christopher J. "The Eagle Comes Home to Roost: The Historical Origins of the CIA's Lethal 
Drone Program." The Eagle Comes Home to Roost: The Historical Origins of the CIA's Lethal Drone 
Program: Intelligence and National Security: Vol 30, No 6. Taylor and Francis, 1 May 2014. Web. 15 Dec. 
2016. 
Mazzetti, Mark. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth. New 
York: Penguin, 2013. Print. 
12 Benjamin, Medea. Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control. London: Verso, 2013. Print 
13 Cockburn, Andrew. Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-tech Assassins. New York: Henry Holt, 2015. 
Print. 40 
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Drones promise precision and a new type of bloodless war and coercive 
capability, but it is yet to be seen if that is the case. For most of the program’s life, the 
coercive strategy it has pursued has been unclear. As Fuller notes, the drone program, 
while its scale is distinctive, is not unprecedented and marks a return to earlier thinking 
on counterterror strategy.14 It is advertised and its origins come from a decapitation 
background, but its extensive use and body count suggest something more like a 
punishment and denial strategy. Decapitation refers to strikes that attempt to decapitate a 
leader from the organization by death or the destruction of political communication 
apparatus. Punishment is a strategy that attempts to break the will of a society at large, 
causing widespread pain for supporting a political entity. A denial strategy is a concerted 
effort to dismantle an enemy’s fighting capacity.15 These terms will be discussed and 
defined later in the chapter. Determining which strategy best meets the desired ends of 
the United States in this facet of the War on Terror is a vital question as the US seeks to 
avoid entering another large ground operation in the Middle East and as the military 
continues to look for technological solutions to strategic problems.  
Drones, and airpower, are not a replacement for counterinsurgency, but rather a 
tool to be used within a comprehensive strategy. A new strategy is necessary that 
maximizes the incredible capabilities of drones and avoids civilian casualties and their 
negative consequences. Broadly, this strategy uses selective killing of militants that are 
key pieces of the organization. For comparison, the Obama administration released the 
                                                 
14 Fuller, Christopher J. "The Eagle Comes Home to Roost: The Historical Origins of the CIA's Lethal 
Drone Program." The Eagle Comes Home to Roost: The Historical Origins of the CIA's Lethal Drone 
Program: Intelligence and National Security:  
15 Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1995. Print. 
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“playbook” of when a drone strike can be launched. Does this document provide a 
suitable balance between aggression and care to avoid civilian casualties? Critics of the 
drone program will say, that regardless of any safeguards, any use and any casualties will 
drive anti-American sentiment, which drives terror recruiting. A clear, transparent, and 
cohesive strategy would avoid these criticisms. Drones should be used to strike only at 
high-level leadership elements, clear militant infrastructure, or forces moving to attack 
across the border.  
Drones are an incredible tool, but they are just that a tool and need a strategy to 
accompany them. Moreover, they need something to create synergy with. There are no 
ground forces that can provide accurate targeting information. One possible solution is an 
intelligence network. To exploit the technology, the drone needs to target the right 
people. It must only kill members of the network that would seriously impede its 
operational and strategic capabilities in the future. If precise killing is used in an 
indiscriminate manner, then the population will join the fight against American interests, 
policies and forces. The debate around drones and the discussion of strategy regarding 
their use is important because it can change the conduct of war and conflict. 
Computerized war is an attractive option as the threshold for using force is lowered, but it 
could drag the United States into an unwanted conflict. As it pertains to this chapter 
though, it represents the policy of conducting counterterrorism operations and poor policy 
will lead to more danger to the United States and its interests. 
Historical 
It is no secret that the United States military has fully embraced ‘net-centric 
warfare’, which values gathering and then sharing information with command and other 
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units and then quickly marshalling appropriate resources for a decisive attack as a way of 
leveraging American technology as a force multiplier. Admiral William Owens, former 
vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress in 2001, “If we are able to view 
a strategic battlefield and prevent an enemy from doing so, we have dominant battlefield 
awareness and we are certain to prevail in a conflict.”16 Drones were not initially 
envisioned as a weapons platform, but rather as a surveillance platform that could show 
enemy movements in real time. From the onset, they were envisioned to bypass the 
friction in war. Fuller also points to the mixed results of bombing Ghaddafi’s Libya in 
1986 and the Beirut hostage crisis as turning points for the need of a surgeon’s scalpel as 
opposed to a sledgehammer.17 Counterterrorism Center Director Clarridge realized that 
the United States “had to find a better way to send a message to outlaw nations that we 
don’t like their behavior short of sending in squadrons of F-111Bs.”18 The old methods of 
coercion were too blunt to solve the problem. The CIA wanted a platform that could send 
a clear and visible message, without massive casualties and no risk to delivery 
personnel.19 This idea was dubbed the Eagle Program. 
Technical Barriers 
Now iconic designs, like the Predator, had extremely humble beginnings. 
Avraheem Karem worked for Israeli Aircraft Industries, a state-owned design shop, until 
he immigrated to the United States in 1977 to undertake his own company that 
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specifically focused on pilotless aircraft.20 Initially, the only suitor for his project was the 
US Navy, in need of a way to guide new, accurate cruise missiles because without 
knowing where the enemy fleet is, the weapons are useless. The program failed, and 
General Atomics purchased Karem’s company, Leading Systems, in 1990.21 The program 
continued to muddle along and appeared headed for the scrap bin, until the GPS 
revolution. Unmanned systems face two significant hurdles to overcome: navigating and 
communicating over the horizon.22 The satellite revolution saved the program. With the 
global positioning system (GPS) satellites, the Predator could be controlled via satellite 
uplink, which made piloting the aircraft a simpler technical task, as its precise location 
would always be known and geographic features could not disrupt the connection. 
Drones came into their own during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999 
when Pentagon staffers referred to them as “CNN in the sky”.23 The video could be 
streamed into generals’ offices, giving them the ability to look directly at the battlefield 
from thousands of miles away, for better and worse. One Air Force officer described the 
hope that the Predator would be able to provide services that only platforms like satellites 
and manned spy planes like the U-2 could provide without risking a pilot or spending 
billions of dollars. Another attractive aspect of drones that neither of those platforms have 
is the ability to loiter over an area for extended periods of time. A satellite can only be 
above an intended area for a few minutes as it hurtles around the planet in orbit and 
manned planes run on limited fuel and only has as much endurance as the human 
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controlling it, so a drone offers the best of both worlds. The officer involved in the 
program said, “The Air Force had this idea the Predator could be used for detecting 
patterns on the battlefield. It would send back the full motion video from a wide area, and 
that would be compared with previous video so they could find changes- new units 
moving in or whatever.”24 The concept was complete awareness of the battlefield became 
an attractive feature in the FATA region now where the lines of soldier and civilian are 
blurred. 
New Visions for the Program 
There is nothing controversial or potentially morally dubious about the program at 
this point. It is an attempt to fulfill the prophecy that technology can give America an 
insurmountable advantage in warfighting capability. The decision to weaponize drones 
came in October 2000 when the CIA was tasked with finding Osama bin Laden, whose 
network was behind the then recent attacks on the USS Cole and the US Embassy 
bombing in Nairobi, Kenya. The CIA used the Predator aircraft to observe suspected Al-
Qaeda and Bin-Laden compound and when they were over Kandahar, they spotted a tall 
man headed to a mosque surrounded with a large following. 25 Immediately, they sought 
authorization to kill him. Unfortunately, a cruise missile launched from a submarine in 
the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean would take hours to arrive and seeing as they could not 
verify if it was in fact Bin-Laden, the potential civilian casualties would not be worth 
moving assets and by the time a cruise missile could arrive too much collateral damage 
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would be caused.26 This also demonstrates that selective killing, as a part of foreign 
policy is not a recent political phenomenon, as this occurred under the Clinton 
Administration. There was also resistance to the Predator program, according to former 
CTC Director Clarke as there was the fear that it was too risky and costly,27 but seeing 
Osama in their sights and being unable to do anything rapidly changed their calculus.28 
This is also the dawn of “signature strikes”, as there was no positive identification that it 
was in fact that it was bin-Laden, but rather behavior that fit his pattern. As will be 
discussed later, a more robust intelligence network will prove more useful than any piece 
of technology because knowing who you are targeting is more precise than what you are 
aiming at. 
In the wake of this incident, the CIA wanted to arm the Predator to avoid such a 
target slipping through their fingers again. Consequently, they turned to the AGM-114 
Hellfire, originally meant for Army attack helicopters as an anti-tank weapon. This 
original intended purpose gave the CIA the confidence that it would be accurate enough 
to hit a target like the suspected Bin-Laden compound. In the 9/11 Commission, George 
Tenet said, “The leadership of the CIA reasoned that if we could develop the capability to 
reliably hit a target with a Hellfire missile and could develop the enabling policy and 
legal framework. We would have a capability to accurately and promptly respond to 
future sighting of high value targets.”29 It passes legal muster on the grounds of the 2001 
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Authorization of the Use of Military Force and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 
that grants the right of self-defense.  
This rush to build this new system has had massive strategic implications on the 
campaign in Pakistan. It is clear in Director Tenet’s testimony that the intelligence 
community did not have a clear goal or strategy for pursuing Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, 
other than seeking to deal retribution.  
The drone program is often described as an assassination program, with positive 
and negative connotations. Positive as in the program can kill without collateral damage, 
but negative as there is minimal legal framework for killing enemies of the United States 
outside of a declaration of war without trial, and where no troops are present. If it is an 
assassination program, then why do only one in seven strikes target leadership?30 It is 
clear what the overarching thinking is that enough killing high-level members of terror 
groups will cripple the group, but doing so without a clear strategy may be detrimental to 
degrading, dismantling, and destroying Al-Qaeda. Moreover, which strategy should the 
United States use for hunting terrorists in politically and logistically denied areas, like the 
tribal regions of Pakistan and under what conditions is this use of air power effective? 
Divergent Opinions on Drones 
After the United States invaded Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban in October 
2001, the al-Qaeda leadership was forced to flee into Pakistan where American troops 
could not pursue them as that would violate the sovereignty of Pakistan, a vital ally in the 
                                                 
30 Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. "Washington's Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone 
Program in Pakistan." Foreign Affairs 90.4 (2011): 12-18. Web. 
 22 
War in Afghanistan as it is the only land-based route for supplies to come into the 
country for American troops. The Pakistani army has proven unwilling to move into the 
areas and clear them. This leaves policymakers at a dead end. To a large extent, it is 
because Pakistan views the Taliban and al-Qaeda as useful proxies. Leaving the Al-
Qaeda members alone and left to their own devices in an unacceptable situation as they 
can use the area to plot for more attacks on American or other European targets, thus 
rendering the invasion of Afghanistan meaningless.  
The obvious options are rather unattractive given the political climate. Sending 
special forces across the border may offer limited civilian casualties, but any civilians 
killed will be at the hands of American forces and if an operation runs into trouble, it 
becomes difficult to support or extract a unit, especially with friendly casualties. 
Moreover, if the Pakistani government grew irritated or reacted to public pressure to stop 
it, then American forces could be in a shooting war with Pakistan, something that the 
invasion of Afghanistan was never meant to cause. If an American were captured, either 
by Al-Qaeda or Pakistani forces, then it would require a massive diplomatic or military 
effort to rectify, which would detract from the reason forces were sent. Air strikes from 
manned platforms or artillery bombardments from across the border are unattractive for 
the same reasons, offensive to Pakistan and risks civilians at too high of a cost if 
something goes awry.  
The answer to this problem was the Predator. They can go to areas too dull, 
dangerous, or dirty for a manned aircraft to go. 31 They can loiter over an area and with 
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advanced thermal and optical sensors they can give commanders the ability to observe 
and then decide once more information becomes available and let events on the ground 
play out.  
Proponent Arguments 
This capability is well suited for the situation in Pakistan as Al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban obviously do not wear uniforms or have standardized vehicles, so determining 
civilian or militant at first glance is impossible. Proponents of the drones point to these 
technological advantages and the limited political options and argue it is the only 
recourse for the United States. Furthermore, scholars, like Byman, argue that their use 
have been exceptionally effective at crippling the Al-Qaeda and Taliban networks 
because the ability to loiter prevents leaders from moving and gathering to plan attacks in 
the US or across the border. They prevent training new recruits as that requires large 
gatherings of men and equipment that is easy for a drone operator to make out. 
There are also questions about the accuracy of reports of a groundswell of anti-
American sentiment. As Christine Fair points out, accurate reporting in a warzone is 
difficult and that documents leaked to the press only portray a small sample.32 Leaked 
statistics from “Operation Haymaker”, an operational element of the overall program, 
that ran from January 2012 to February 2013. There are 35 “jackpots”, which are known 
al-Qaeda or Taliban operatives, but 219 “EKIA”, or enemies killed in action. Those 
critical of the drone program look at that statistic and argue that many of those killed are 
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innocent. Fair, however, argues that none of those near al-Qaeda members notorious 
enough to end up on the intelligence community’s docket is at the very least a terror 
sympathizer and a legitimate target. It is also possible that those killed are either 
bodyguards or associates and are also legitimate. She also cites a Pakistani study that 
found at least 194 people killed in the attacks, about 70 percent–at least 138–were 
militants. The remaining 56 were either civilians or tribal police, and 38 of them were 
killed in a single attack on March 17, 2011. Excluding one catastrophically disastrous 
strike which inflicted one of the worst civilian death tolls since the drone program started 
in Pakistan, nearly 90 percent of the people killed were militants.33 She also makes the 
case that in the FATA regions, the drones are the lesser of two evils. According to Fair, 
al-Qaeda and the Taliban present a larger daily danger to civilians in these regions than 
drones do. One Pakistani newspaper editorial wrote in 2012 that, heavily armed groups 
using their towns as staging grounds is more of a threat to their sovereignty and safety 
than drone strikes. It also argues that militancy that arises out of drone strikes is a minor 
problem compared to other sources.34 
It is possible that local villagers resent the terror groups using their villages as 
safe havens, which makes them targets. They may also resent them for usurping their way 
of life and political structures, like the sentiments that spurred the Sunni Awakening in 
Iraq in late 2006 and early 2007. This view and posture is overall too aggressive 
represents a vengeful side of American foreign policy thinking. This is killing without a 
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cause. There is no end goal for strikes under this theory other than killing terrorists is 
good. There must be a more reasonable and level-headed approach. 
Dissent on Drone Strikes 
Others, like Tiedemann and Bergen view drone strikes as overall detrimental to 
American efforts because the civilian casualties the accompany the strikes only stoke 
anti-American sentiment and any militants killed are replaced. As former head of Joint 
Special Operations Command and current choice for the Trump Administration’s national 
security advisor, General Michael T Flynn said, ““When you drop a bomb from a 
drone… you are going to cause more damage than you are going to cause good… the 
more bombs we drop, that just… fuels the conflict.”35 The detractors of the drone 
program argue that any “decapitation” of a leader will only spur more recruits, thus 
increasing the organization’s size and popularity relative to before the strike. 
There are two divergent opinions on the policy of drone strikes, so is one side 
correct? The truth lays somewhere in between. A sound strategy is one that is not as 
cavalier as Fair demands, but the opportunity chip away at al-Qaeda and other groups 
cannot be denied. Drones strikes are the only politically acceptable option in these 
circumstances, but they need to have a clear strategic vision and guidelines. Air power 
does not guarantee victory by any means. It is a tool, that if used incorrectly, can prove 
more harmful than doing nothing at all. 
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Strategic Picture 
The two prevailing perspectives offer a polarized view on drone strikes, but it 
takes a detailed and clear strategy to succeed. Strategy is what connects means and ends, 
so in the efforts to defeat al-Qaeda there must be a concerted effort use drones in a way 
that completes the objective of destroying al-Qaeda, while not creating problems for the 
future. The debate about drone strikes needs more nuance. A strategy that can emphasize 
the incredible abilities while avoiding the civilian casualties is what is required. Both 
sides passionately argue for their views to be heeded, but only the pro-strike camp has a 
testable way to defeat al-Qaeda. Albeit, this does not mean the order to fire at will should 
be given, as Fair would have it. Rather, there must be a balance. 
Each side makes a strong case, but there needs to be a strategy to reconcile the 
differences while accentuating strengths and minimizing weaknesses. The overarching 
question remains that while drones are an effective tactic, are these military victories 
translating to political success?36 Because of drones’ inherent qualities, they are well 
suited for attacking al-Qaeda leadership. The goal behind striking leadership is to take 
charismatic personalities that these organizations need for recruitment and legitimacy off 
the roster and these personalities are not easily replaced.37 Although Bin-Laden was not 
killed in a drone strike, al-Qaeda has struggled to replace him with Ayman al-Zawahiri 
and have thus fallen in the terrorist hierarchy. This causes the promotion of inexperienced 
and unqualified leaders who stumble into errors that will then gradually deplete the 
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manpower of the organization. Eliminating high value targets is the goal, but as Byman 
notes, killing specialists, like forgers, bombmakers, and fundraisers, which eliminates 
skills that cannot be replaced overnight. Proponents, like Byman, also argue that because 
drones can loiter for hours and aircraft rotating in can make surveillance constant, it is 
impossible for leadership to meet or communicate. Drone strikes can make training and 
command and control apparatus a threat to their safety because the group must choose 
between having no leaders or dead leaders.38 As America seeks to draw down its 
presence, drones allow for a smaller footprint and as previously mentioned, they are less 
destructive than conventional alternatives. 
On the other hand, other scholars and analysts like Tiedemann and Bergen, argue 
that drone strikes in the tribal regions of Pakistan undermine the broader effort to defeat 
al-Qaeda because the civilian casualties that come with the strikes stokes anti-American 
sentiment, thus replacing the losses in the initial strike. Furthermore, what have the 
strikes accomplished? They have made terror leaders cease using electronic 
communication, making tracking them more difficult. Attempted attacks have still 
occurred, like the Detroit Christmas Day airplane bombing and the failed Time’s Square 
bomber in 2010 received training in Pakistan. Walsh also points out that attempting to 
decapitate leadership is only effective if the organization is small and thus unable to 
sufficiently replace men.39 Walsh also raises a unique criticism that because the United 
States does not know which groups are on the ground and that targeting the area without 
understanding the group dynamics may change and create new alliances among terror 
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groups, which may be more dangerous than before because of drones. That is why I 
propose the drone program needs to be meshed with an intelligence network to create 
synergy and it will be a more effective strategy. 
The divergence in opinion does not provide a clear understanding for how to 
proceed with combating terrorism. The United States cannot cede territory and a haven to 
al-Qaeda and drones are the only viable option. One needs to turn to numerical analysis 
to formulate a strategy that can operate between the polarized opinions.  Ultimately, al-
Qaeda cannot be allowed to operate with impunity, so drone strikes present a useful tool, 
but they should not be relied on as a strategy by themselves. 
Need for a Cohesive Strategy 
Drones can be an effective coercive tool, but only in limited conditions and within 
a clearly defined strategy. Although the drone program has been labeled as an 
assassination program, the numbers of senior leaders killed in drone strikes do not 
support this. This fact demonstrates the overall lack of a cohesive strategy. At the heart of 
the debate on drones as a strategic coercive tool, is the question about how many civilians 
have they killed. Obviously, this is a difficult task given that there is no way to 
independently verify reports. Pakistani media outlets likely have inflated reports because 
they are getting information from insurgents or pushing an anti-American sentiment to 
grab attention.  
The United States had run the program through the Central Intelligence Agency, 
so it would often decline comment about a strike and if it did announce that a militant 
was killed, the numbers of civilians killed would be significantly lower than the Pakistani 
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report. So, one must turn to outside data. According to the New America Foundation,40 a 
non-profit, open source database that has tracked every reported drone strike. By their 
tally, during the height of the program in 2011, the United States had struck Pakistan 233 
times. From June 2004 to April 7, 2011 drone strikes killed between 1,435 and 2,283 
people and somewhere between 1,145 and 1,822 of those were described as militants in 
reliable press sources.41 Tiedemann and Bergen argue that even though more than 1,000 
militants have been taken off the battlefield, attacks have sharply risen from the time 
before drones were used. According to the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, 
attacks in Pakistan have risen from 150 in 2004 to 1,916 in 2009. Also, suicide attacks 
tripled in the first half of 2010 compared to the first half of 2009.42 This would seemingly 
confirm that drone strikes do in fact cause more harm than good because they stoke anger 
and force groups to morph into more cells that have more autonomy. But Walsh’s use of 
30-day regression analysis through 2011 reveals a different pattern and he argues that the 
there is no proof that drone strikes are galvanizing the insurgency.43  
In Afghanistan and Pakistan through 2011, attacks were on the rise, which would 
give credence to the argument that Tiedemann and Bergen espouse, but after this date, 
there is a decline in terrorist activity. Furthermore, there appears to be no correlation 
between the number of civilians killed and terror attacks. When attacks were at their peak 
in 2010-2011, civilian casualties were either in decline or level. As 2011 progressed, 
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attacks decreased as did civilian casualties. For there to be a causal relationship, civilian 
casualties would need to rise as well as attacks for the argument to stand up. The data for 
Afghanistan shows that terror attacks increase before drone strikes and then decrease 
after. That may sound convincing that drones are a net positive, but it is plausible that the 
terror groups expend their energy and resources and then need to retreat. Drones may not 
be a part of their calculus of when to launch attacks in Afghanistan at all. In Pakistan in 
2010, terror attacks were met with increased drone strikes. As the year progressed, and 
the number of militants killed increased, attacks decreased, which suggests that drone 
strikes reduced terror groups ability to launch strikes.44 As with any data set, it is up to 
interpretation, so one can only extrapolate. Also, the evidence is limited insofar as it only 
suggests the effects and consequences of drone strikes, but these events are not occurring 
within a vacuum and could be attributed to other causes, like the increase in American 
forces in Afghanistan in 2010 or the killing of Osama bin Laden, which forced al-Qaeda 
to restructure. From a strategic standpoint, these strikes do not change the overall balance 
because they have not been integrated into a general counterterror strategy. 
Drone strikes are effective at tracking, targeting, and killing militants, but it is 
unclear what exactly the strikes are attempting to accomplish. The fact that only one in 
seven strikes killed a high-level leader does not indicate a decapitation strategy. The 
civilian casualties indicate a desire to wither support for the terror groups. Drones are 
clearly not a detrimental tool because of their incredible capabilities, but they need a 
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strategy to maximize their positive capabilities while minimizing the civilian casualties 
and their negative effects. 
Categorization of Drones 
The four categories of air power strategy that Pape describes are punishment, risk, 
denial, and decapitations. The campaign in Pakistan does not fit neatly into a single 
category, but they all share the goal of inducing some political change. The primary 
criticism of drone strikes is that they cause civilian casualties, so Pape’s first category of 
punishment is not applicable. A punishment campaign would be conducted to cause the 
maximum damage and shock an enemy population.45 A punishment strategy is 
comparable to the carpet-bombing campaigns in the Second World War, indiscriminately 
targeting cities. A punishment strategy carried out to a lesser extent would target civilian 
infrastructure. The objective of such a strategy is to cause a popular revolt. Pursuing such 
a strategy runs afoul of moral norms, but it would be completely ineffective seeing as the 
tribal regions of Pakistan do not have major pieces of infrastructure. Punishment is 
intended to cause as much misery as possible to make the targets capitulate instantly. A 
popular revolt is also unlikely as al-Qaeda are already a fringe group and in northern 
Pakistan they are among their tribal counterparts, so expecting a betrayal is rather 
unlikely.  
A risk campaign is like punishment, but instead of immediate, massive 
destruction, it would gradually raise the pace and intensity of strikes to force a society to 
reconsider the costs of continuing a conflict. This was the strategy employed in Vietnam. 
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The third category, denial, attacks military targets, including field forces, logistics, 
command centers, communication nodes, and weapons plants and raw military material. 
A decapitation strategy attacks key leadership targets, like homes and respective offices. 
The objective of a decapitation strategy is to separate the leadership and elites of society 
from the general population and offer a society an alternative to violence. The separation 
can be the grave or severing any ties they have to society that could be used to apply 
pressure to the society. It also targets communications networks and political centers and 
economic hubs to cut off leadership to cause political paralysis.46 
Organizations, like al-Qaeda, may be more hardened against decapitation because 
they have a developed bureaucracy.47 Al-Qaeda has existed long enough to develop 
institutional routines that establish norms and rules for recruitment and a chain of 
command, eliminating succession problems. A leader’s message becomes part of the 
institution over time and even if a leader is eliminated, the message can be a proxy for the 
personality.48 The argument against decapitation theorizes that targeting leadership is 
“unlikely to diminish al-Qaeda’s long-term operational capacity to engage in terrorist 
activity.”49 Al-Qaeda’s behavior as a group does not indicate a weakness to decapitation, 
according to Jordan. She argues that because al-Qaeda is a religious group with enough 
size, it has the experience to resist decapitation because older and larger groups have 
developed a bureaucracy to replace losses.  
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This perspective holds true if taking about one individual leader. Had a drone 
strike been used to kill Osama bin Laden in May 2011, Ayman al-Zawahiri would still 
have ascended to head the organization. That is not the point of the drone program as 
evidenced throughout its history and extensive use. The point of the drone program is to 
wage a war of attrition without placing any American personnel in harm’s way. No 
organization can withstand the repeated loss of mid-level commanders, financiers, and 
other experts. It is like a football team losing players to injury throughout the season. A 
good team can withstand an injury to one key individual, but the sustained loss of role 
players throws the team into chaos and they lose cohesion. Price, among others, take a 
similar view and agree with the sentiment that terror groups are vulnerable because of the 
importance of leadership and the difficulties of succession.50 Terror groups do not want to 
advertise their organizational hierarchy and chain of command because that would make 
them susceptible to attack. There are also competitions for power within groups, so the 
elimination of leaders, especially mid-level ones, can radically alter the group.  
Outlining a More Effective Policy 
The drone strikes embody parts of denial and decapitation strategies, but neither is 
perfectly suited for the drone campaign. As a denial strategy, drones are used to attack 
forces in the field and command centers, but al-Qaeda is an insurgency and does not have 
clear command structures. It operates within and among a society. Also, its 
communication network is either a public satellite network or the regular cellular data 
network. Completely dismantling this is not in the interest of pursuing a strategy to 
                                                 
50 Price, Bryan C. "Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to 
Counterterrorism." International Security 36.4 (2012): 9-46. Web. 18 
 34 
dismantle al-Qaeda because the signals intelligence gathered often provide the locations 
for strikes. Recently, ISIS spokesman Mohammad al-Adnani was killed in a strike in 
Syria because he was most likely picked up by signals intelligence, which shows how 
effectively drones can be in a hunter-killer role.51  
The US military attacked cell towers or commercial satellites, this would not have 
been possible. Now ISIS faces the conundrum of how to deliver their message. Of course, 
any opportunity to strike training facilities or fighters moving into Afghanistan ought to 
be taken, but al-Qaeda does not wear uniforms and insurgencies are diffuse, so these 
opportunities are rare. The decapitation strategy is the goal. Ideally, one would like to 
target centers of political power and cordon al-Qaeda off from the rest of the world, but 
again al-Qaeda is an insurgency and insurgencies do not have political offices or 
economic infrastructure. Again, they share resources with the society they operate 
among. The core concept is that al-Qaeda and other terror groups offer no simple 
prescription because they are amorphous and not easily categorizable, but a sound drone 
strategy will decapitate leaders from rank and file members by death or fear of it. This 
new strategy should also grasp onto certain aspects of a denial strategy as it prevents 
fighters from training, mobilizing, or launching attacks. That is why I hypothesize that 
developing an intelligence network will yield the best results at finding these key role 
players and thus finding opportunities to target them without civilian casualties. 
What is required is a hybrid campaign. A balance between aggression and 
patience. Drone strikes should be used to attack leadership elements. I define leadership 
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elements as not only those that are on well-known to the public and media, like Zawahiri 
or al-Baghdadi, but the mid-level commanders that carry out the operations of groups. 
These are the targets most vulnerable to attack and are the most difficult to replace. 
Senior leadership can avoid the use of electronic communication because they focus on 
strategic issues of the groups, but commanders need to receive and share information, 
which requires some use of electronic message. Courier is simply too slow. Aggression 
towards the middle ranks is most likely to alter their behavior and slow terror activities.  
Some may point to the mixed findings in studies like Igoe’s that do not find a 
consistent link between drone strikes in Pakistan and increased attacks in Afghanistan. 
Clearly, drone strikes are not provoking the reaction that some have anticipated, but the 
objective of the drone program is not to slow insurgent activities in Afghanistan, it is to 
undercut al-Qaeda. The drone campaign has been fundamental in the disruption of al-
Qaeda, as evidenced by their failure to organize a well-funded and well-coordinated 
attack on American or European soil. It may also force the charismatic leaders to put 
themselves into public view, which then puts them at risk.  
Drones are only a piece of counterterrorism and they should be used to disrupt 
organizations, like al-Qaeda in the FATA region, but they should not be counted on to 
singlehandedly destroy them. There needs to be a synergy between drone strikes and 
some other force, be it the Pakistani military or an increased NATO presence in eastern 
Afghanistan and a concerted propaganda campaign. Drone strikes do not fundamentally 
alter the politics of these regions because the amount of violence they bring is relatively 
small, which is why they can, at best, be a disruptive force. That disruption should then 
be used to push back on other areas, like counterinsurgency and propaganda.  
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Also, airpower needs another element to synergize with. There are no forces on 
the ground to direct strikes or collect information. The program relies on intelligence 
from sources in cities elsewhere in the world. What could create synergy are proper spy 
networks in the area. Obviously, this would be difficult given the suspicion of outsiders 
and the family connections that define the regions, but it is worth trying. These networks 
could help avoid civilian casualties, thus reducing the recruitment backlash. It would also 
increase the opportunity to target specific leaders or groups of fighters. Airpower needs to 
be combined with another force on the ground to be able to take advantage of the 
technology and capabilities that drones provide. 
Signature strikes should no longer be tolerated given the intense scrutiny of 
civilian casualties, regardless of their perceived “innocence”, as Fair would have it. The 
way the United States can have the drone program backfire is if it loses the propaganda 
war. Signature strikes, when remotely piloted aircraft target suspicious behavior, like 
convoys of vehicles or larger gatherings, have led to mistakes and civilians killed.52 
Strikes should only be used when there is a relative certainty that civilians are not 
endangered by a strike. In small villages, like in the FATA region, this is difficult, but it 
means waiting for the right opportunity. If civilians are in the way, then a strike should 
only be undertaken once they leave the area. If they do not, then perhaps a strike should 
not be authorized. Of course, this depends on the importance of the target, if it were 
Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, then obviously, the United States should 
strike. If it is a financier or low-level commander is the target, then that opportunity 
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should be passed on because they will most likely present themselves again. The United 
States also ought to be transparent about strikes that are contested. If a group is claiming 
that civilians were killed, then the Department of Defense, which now runs he drone 
program,53 should release a commentated video detailing why authorization was given. 
This policy would represent a more effective use of airpower in a time when war is not 
between states because the boundaries of 21st century conflict are blurred at best. 
Winning the propaganda war is more important than a body count. 
The Playbook 
The Obama Administration released its so-called “playbook” for authorization of 
a drone strike. The Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) that outlines “The Procedures for 
Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States 
and Areas of Active Hostilities.”54 This is an improvement over the times of CIA control, 
which would deny when a strike would occur, but there are still areas of ambiguity that 
need to be clarified before this program can be a part of a viable counterterror strategy. 
The document states that “The most important policy objective, particularly informing 
consideration of lethal action, is to protect American lives.”55 This does not clearly define 
how expansive a threat is. It does not seek a balance between aggression and patience 
because how expansive the category is. This is partially to give the Obama 
Administration leeway to make decisions, but it shows that the technology has outpaced 
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the understanding of how it should be applied. It also states the preference for capture, 
which is a good idea, given that captured targets can give intelligence, as opposed to the 
dead, who cannot. Although, raids are riskier and are thus less likely to be approved than 
a drone strike. It defines a non-combatant as someone who is not targetable under the law 
of armed conflict, thus eliminating some of the objections to reporting and assessment of 
collateral damage that Fair raises. 
The document outlines that a strike is authorized when there is near certainty that 
an identified HVT or other lawful targets are present, near certainty that non-combatants 
will not be injured or killed, and capture is not feasible because of the risk to American 
personnel and/or the incapacity of a regional actor to deal with the problem. This would 
be a person placing improvised explosive devices or munitions stores. Before a strike is 
launched, the HVT needs to be positively identified and the relevant officials, including 
the President agree that a strike is necessary. It also outlines how the authorization from a 
strike moves from the intelligence community up to the President, which gives more 
transparency to the process. The requirement for positive identification also prevents a 
strike based on faulty intelligence. It also creates a uniform after action report that 
requires: a description of the operation, a summary to determine that the operation 
satisfied the criteria for a strike, an assessment of whether the operation achieved its 
objective, the number of combatants killed or wounded, and a description of collateral 
damage.56 
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Make no mistake about it, this represents strategic progress, but it is still too 
vague and seems to address the fear of casualties more than it seeks to achieve the 
objective of degrading al-Qaeda. Fundamentally, war is about killing and 
counterinsurgencies are about killing the right people. Drone strikes should look to attack 
the lynchpins of al-Qaeda. Obviously, civilian casualties ought to be avoided, but as Igoe 
points out, drone strikes have little influence, positive or negative, on the amount of 
insurgent violence.57 Skeptics like Jordan are correct in their theorization that some 
insurgent groups are large and have enough bureaucratic resilience to overcome losses, 
but they cannot overcome the consistent depletion of mid-level commanders.58 The PPG 
is a positive step towards transparency, but using the video to shame al-Qaeda for using 
human shields and should highlight the efforts that the US goes to avoid civilian 
casualties. The proper drone strategy is one that looks for small victories, which will keep 
the core of the organization on the run and incapable of planning and organizing for 
attacks against the United States or the war in Afghanistan. At the same time, if there is a 
risk of civilian casualties, authorization should not be given because drones alone will not 
destroy al-Qaeda. Ideally, there would be pressure on al-Qaeda on multiple fronts. That 
would include pressure from the drone strikes, propaganda, special forces raids, and then 
the Pakistani military would encircle and clear the areas. Asking drones to destroy al-
Qaeda by themselves is a fallacy. An intelligence network would create synergy for 
drones and perhaps create an alternative to the kinetic option. 
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Conclusions About Drone Strikes 
There are two prevailing perspectives on drone strikes in the FATA region in 
Pakistan. The first postulate is that drone strikes espouses that drone strikes spur 
recruiting and backlash against the United States, like Tiedemann, Bergen, and Benjamin 
argue. Others, like Jordan, argue that drone strikes are not effective against bureaucratic 
organizations, like al-Qaeda. Drone advocates, like Byman and Fair, although she is more 
towards the extreme, argue that drones are the best of bad options and cite evidence, like 
Igoe’s analysis, that there is no correlation between drone strikes and terrorist activity. 
They also question the validity of reporting on the anger that drone strikes cause. The 
truth is that drones are neither dubious, morally bankrupt assassins, nor are they a 
panacea to destroy al-Qaeda singlehandedly. They need to be integrated into a broad 
counterterror strategy that presses al-Qaeda. They ought to be utilized in a decapitation 
role that selectively engages critical organizational infrastructure, like financiers and 
operational commanders. But if civilians are in the way, the strike is not worth the cost 
and patience is the best strategic option. Ultimately, the drone campaign ought to find the 
balance of aggression and patience that embodies all counterinsurgency efforts. It also 
needs to find synergy to exploit. 
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Chapter Three: Invasion of Afghanistan and an Examination of the 
Afghan Model 
The opening blows of the War in Afghanistan are often cited and hailed as an 
outright victory for airpower as a military and foreign policy strategy, but the results are 
much less conclusive than that. I hypothesize that airpower was most effective against the 
conventionally organized Taliban when fighting against the relatively equally skilled 
Northern Alliance. Airpower was much less effective against the higher skilled al-Qaeda 
forces. Therefore, I conclude that the “Afghan Model” should only be replicated against 
low-to-middle tier conventional adversaries.  
In this chapter, I analyze the unique geostrategic circumstances that created the 
need for this strategy. Furthermore, I discuss the differing perspectives on the 
applicability of the “Afghan Model”, which ranges from a unique circumstance, to a 
paradigm shifting strategy that would alter the conduct of war. I draw conclusions about 
the “Afghan Model” by charting the progress of the opening stages of the conflict and 
comparing the success of the strategy against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. To do this, I used 
first-hand accounts and official histories. Often anecdotal evidence and accounts from the 
war boost the credibility of the “Afghan Model” and airpower as a whole, but instead I 
saw a limited range of conflict type and intensity where the Model was useful. The goal 
of this chapter is to show that airpower cannot be used as one-size-fits-all tool of coercive 
political power. Rather, when used in the right situation, against the right adversary, it 
can have an effect that is greater than the sum of its parts. Synergy between ground and 
air, is more important than attempting to achieve victory merely by superior firepower. 
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Historical Background 
9/11 called for swift, decisive action. It is no coincidence that the first CIA teams 
inserted into Afghanistan in early October 2001 were given the call sign, Jawbreaker.59 
The desire for revenge and justice against al-Qaeda and the Taliban was almost 
instantaneously damped when the realities of going to war in Afghanistan set in. As then 
Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice notes, “You look at the map, you look at 
Afghanistan and you look at where it is- I think the color kind of drained from 
everybody’s face… I think everybody thought ‘Of all the places to fight a war, 
Afghanistan would not be our choice.’ But we didn’t chose Afghanistan; Afghanistan 
chose us”.60  
This geographic reality limited the options that military planners had, so the only 
realistic option was turning to airpower combined with special forces fighting alongside 
allied indigenous forces. Dubbed the “Afghan Model”, this use of military strength, 
combining special forces, airpower, and indigenous allies, has been heralded as a more 
efficient way of warfighting.61 “The United States took decisive action. With Special 
Operations Forces, CIA operatives, and US airpower in support, the Northern Alliance 
and friendly Pashtun tribes in the south were able to vanquish the Taliban forces and 
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chase them and their al-Qaeda allies into Iran and Pakistan.62” The manner and speed 
with which the Taliban were dispatched and the technological leaps that the 21st century 
offered gave the illusion that the long-proclaimed “Revolution in Military Affairs” had 
been realized and that the nature and conduct of war would be decided by technology and 
expertise. While the prediction that airpower would reign supreme and the “Afghan 
Model” of warfighting would alter American military posture were premature and faulty 
in their conclusion, it did highlight the potent synergy between ground and air forces. 
Many point to the fact that in under two months, the Northern Alliance, who had been 
stuck in a stalemate against the Taliban, could vanquish the Taliban once special forces 
combined with strike fighters and bombers armed with precision-guided munitions joined 
them. The stunning statistics that in fewer than eight weeks, six provinces, three key 
cities were liberated and about 10,000 Taliban forces were killed.63 It also demonstrates 
the importance of a clearly defined political objective. Moreover, the lessons from the 
rapid assault of Afghanistan should be understood within the context of the engagement 
and not be applied to a conflict of different intensity or a more capable adversary. 
 The Afghan Model was more successful against the Taliban when they organized 
as a conventional force, but was less successful against al-Qaeda fighters who utilized 
tactics that are typical of an insurgency. Moreover, the Afghan Model is only useful in a 
specific range of conflict intensity against conventional forces that belong to a nation-
state. Understanding these lessons and the context is significant to using the assets of the 
United States military in a way that will produce positive outcomes. This is especially 
                                                 
62 Collins, Joseph J. Understanding the War in Afghanistan: A Guide to the Land, the People, and the 
Conflict. New York: Skyhorse Pub., 2013. Print. 2 
63 Wright, 88 
 44 
important in this time as the fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State rages on and a 
similar strategy is being employed. 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Taliban and al-Qaeda were unsure exactly 
how the US would react.64 The way previous administrations responded to terror attacks 
at the Marine Barracks in Lebanon in 1983, the USS Cole attack in 2000, and the US 
Embassy bombing in Nairobi in 1998 offered only a fraction of the ferocity that the 
American military could bring to bear. The attacks of 9/11 were directed at American 
landmarks and symbols of American power.65 Al-Qaeda and the Taliban were somewhat 
emboldened by the weak responses of the previous decade. No doubt they understood 
that there would be bombs and cruise missiles, but they were confident that they could 
weather that storm, as they already had. They also believed that if the US conducted a 
full-scale invasion, they could bleed them out in the same manner as the Soviet Union. 
As it often is in war, the least expected scenario is the one that came to fruition. Given the 
political and geographic restrictions that Afghanistan, the way the war commenced, a mix 
of airpower, special forces, and indigenous allies it was the only way it could have 
unfolded.  
Logistics and Politics 
General Robert H. Barrow, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, quipped in 
1980 that “Amateurs think about tactics, but professionals think about logistics”.66 The 
emergence of the Afghan Model also had much to do with Afghanistan’s geostrategic 
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position. As the quote from former Secretary Rice indicates, fighting a war in 
Afghanistan would be a logistical nightmare. As a landlocked country, a naval 
expeditionary force was out of the question. Located in central Asia, there are neither 
nations in the vicinity part of NATO nor were they politically capable of lending the US 
full support. It would be impossible to only conduct the air campaign via long range 
strategic bombers. Air crews have limited stamina and the maintenance required on these 
vital national assets can put them out of commission for days at a time. There also must 
be search and rescue crews on standby in the area of operations to recover crewmembers 
of downed planes and the sensitive equipment they carry. Conducting missions without 
nearby search and rescue and assorted support staff would put the entire campaign at risk. 
To conduct a campaign like this, basing rights are essential. As Wright points out, 
negotiating these agreements is extraordinarily difficult. In the north, Afghanistan is 
neighbored by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. As 
former Soviet satellite states, they remained in Moscow’s sphere of influence and putting 
heavy mechanized forces there would prove politically infeasible67.  
To the south-east is Pakistan, which came with its own unique political obstacles. 
Pakistan had always been interested in the politics of its neighbor. Fearful of being 
encircled by hostile states, it had sheltered and supported the mujahedeen in the 1980s. In 
2001, not only was the population sympathetic to the Taliban, the Pakistani government 
was threatening conflict with India at the time.68 After 9/11, Deputy Secretary of State 
Richard Armitage, gave senior Pakistani officials an ultimatum of support America or 
                                                 
67 Wight, 35 
68 Wright, 36 
 46 
fight it.69 Pakistan came around eventually to provide logistical support, but many 
including James Dobbins, the Bush administration’s Special Envoy for the post-Taliban 
conferences questioned how committed Pakistan really was, “After 9/11 the American 
and Pakistani services found themselves suddenly aligned again, this time in seeking to 
overthrow the very regime the ISI had installed in Kabul.”70 There were legitimate 
questions as to how seriously Pakistan would attack a potentially useful surrogate. To the 
west, Iran. Given Iran’s perpetual opposition to American interests, it would be of no 
help. To secure the necessary basing and overflight rights, careful diplomacy was 
necessary. Russian President Vladimir Putin was one of the leaders to offer moral support 
and the use of Russian air space. He also urged the central Asian states to cooperate. That 
support was limited as Russia would obviously not tolerate heavy mechanized forces on 
its southern border for an extended period.71 Even with the cooperation of these states 
and limited Russian cooperation, the bases were not suitable for heavy transport aircraft 
and such a buildup would take too long and thus allow senior leadership to flee.  
The Afghan Model 
The only realistic plan to respond was with small special forces teams (SOF) and 
with air power working alongside the Northern Alliance. For any other state, these 
obstacles may have proved insurmountable, but the United States military was in a 
unique position to launch sustained air campaign. Global basing of strategic air assets, 
particularly at Diego Garcia AFB, an atoll with a military grade airstrip put American 
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forces in the region. The US military also has an unrivaled aerial tanker fleet that could 
make strike missions from farther outposts possible. The ten aircraft carriers that are the 
bedrock of the US Navy also provide ample opportunity to hit back, but it still requires 
flyover rights from Pakistan. Waging a war with airpower in the forefront is 
diplomatically straining and requires a vast logistical network that very few states can 
attempt. It is not a solution to every military contingency. 
The question of the applicability of the Afghan Model looms large, especially 
given the rise of IS and disorder within Syria. The speed and decisiveness of the rout of 
the Taliban surprised all involved, including the war planners, who viewed the 
combination of special forces and indigenous allies mostly as stage setters for a larger 
force.72 Some, like Andres Wills and Griffith, see broad applicability and others, like 
Biddle see its use in a much more restricted set of scenarios. As Biddle points out, then 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld testified and argued that the rapid assault was so 
effective, the US military should shift its doctrine and fully commit to it by decreasing 
the number of infantry forces and increasing the investment in standoff weapons.73 This 
is the allure of airpower; its power and destructive capability show a way to fight a war 
without friction or chaos, just ballistic calculations.74 If one adheres to the postulation 
that the combination of airpower, special forces, and indigenous allies is an unstoppable 
force, then the need for ground forces and en masse infantry engagements is gone.  
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Commitment to the Afghan Model without skepticism, let alone fundamental 
changes to military posture, would be a failure of policy and strategy. I concur with 
Biddle that the applicability of the Afghan Model is narrow, but I argue that using 
airpower in such a manner can, at most, provide a tactical battlefield victory and, at 
worst, undermine the overarching strategic objectives and reasons for using airpower and 
American power in the first place. Moreover, the Afghan Model ought to only be used 
against middle tier convention adversaries fielded by nation-states. This avoids complex 
tribal politics and allows synergy between ground and air to be exploited. 
Taliban Origins and Strategy 
To fully comprehend and evaluate the Afghan Model, one must be somewhat 
familiar with the strategy and political views of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. It is also 
important to recognize these realities because if American forces work and operate 
among these people, it would be wise to be aware of more than just the American 
perspective. There is a common misconception that Afghanistan is a place that is stuck in 
the Middle Ages, but it has a long and complex history that go beyond the scope of this 
chapter. 75 After the Soviet Union withdrew, a period of civil war ensued against the 
Soviet-backed Communist regime that remained in Kabul until it collapsed in 1991.76  
The origins of the Taliban’s political ideology come from the generation of 
generation of young men displaced by the Soviet invasion who were exposed to 
fundamentalist Islam that thrived in Pashtun areas in the areas around Peshawar. 
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Fundamentalism combined with the anger from unemployment that comes with refugee 
status developed a culture that sought, simple answers to Afghan problems and these 
answers often came through violent means.77 The Taliban, as a political entity, are 
primarily based on tribal allegiance, despite claims of a universal ideology and often 
brutalized other ethnic groups. 78 Their battle against these other ethnic groups that come 
to be known as the Northern Alliance was mostly fought as a conventional battle for 
territory to solidify their political rule in the opening moves of the war. 
For al-Qaeda and Osama bin-Laden, Afghanistan was the first state in a new 
caliphate.79 The Taliban and al-Qaeda formed a symbiotic relationship because of Osama 
bin-Laden’s ability, experience and funding to set up training camps that prepared 
fighters to do battle against the Northern Alliance. Beyond the idea that Afghanistan was 
the beginning of a caliphate, it gave bin-Laden the legitimacy to declare jihad against the 
US for the perceived occupation and plunder of Arabia.80 To reiterate, the Taliban and al-
Qaeda believed that based on the response to the attacks against the USS Cole and the 
Nairobi embassy, the US would launch airstrikes and send cruise missiles, but they knew 
that they could avoid the likely targets and survive. If the US decided to launch a full-
scale invasion, then they could use that as propaganda to foster recruitment and build the 
narrative of a battle of the West versus Islam. The Taliban and al-Qaeda expected a large 
American invasion to fare as well as the Soviet invasion and occupation went.  
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They would have likely repeated the same tactics and strategies that would bleed 
out a large, cumbersome conventional force that was not capable of engaging guerrillas. 
The Bush Administration was cognizant of Afghanistan’s reputation as the “graveyard of 
empires”81 and thus desired to avoid creating an insurgency. The pessimism within the 
Administration that the campaign would fail stemmed from history, the geography, and 
the sense of being unprepared for such a mission.82 There was also the sense that given 
these factors, if the US wanted to oust the Taliban and al-Qaeda, there would need to be a 
heavy engagement. Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders saw the use of airpower in the 1990s 
and share the sentiments of many American policymakers thinking that it was an 
overrated strategy and that the US would need to use large numbers of troops to fight in 
Afghanistan and in this scenario, they felt emboldened.83 This perspective attempts to 
legitimize the strength of airpower relative to other military strategies, but as will be 
discussed in depth later. It is not about the mere capability of airpower, it is using it 
selectively against a certain type of enemy, principally against a conventional force, not 
one that espouses the tactics of an insurgency. 
Anecdotal Discussion about the Afghan Model 
The opening maneuvers of the War in Afghanistan and Operation Enduring 
Freedom provide numerous stories and characters that could turn into an action movie, 
but reveling detracts from learning and drawing conclusions about strategy. It is 
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important and necessary to examine and inspect some accounts so that conclusions about 
the applicability of the Afghan Model can be made. 
Tora Bora 
The Battle of Tora Bora, the engagement that is known as when bin-Laden 
slipped away from American forces. This happened despite the availability of the full 
might of the US Air Force, numerous special forces units, and being surrounded by 
indigenous allies. One would expect to be a rousing success given the readily available 
airpower and numerous Afghan allies. The explanation, as it often is when military 
operations come up short, is that politicians let down the soldiers. Many such as former 
Delta Force operator and writer, Dalton Fury, believe that had they had more American 
forces, the outcome would have been different.84 To secure such rugged terrain though, 
would have required hundreds of troops, something that was logistically impossible. 
While it is true that more troops would have, the Afghan Model’s goal is to use as few 
American forces as possible and as Crumpton notes General Franks had a vision of 
indigenous Afghans serving as the primary ground force for the mission with US support. 
It was important to integrate and coordinate with the different groups and keep the 
coalition together.85 This means that politics and alliance making is crucial to the Afghan 
Model. Indigenous groups have their own policy visions and the relationship exists if it is 
mutually beneficial.  
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The use of indigenous allies also requires careful balancing to not favor one group 
over another to avoid stoking ethnic conflict. Pashtun groups that were not allied with the 
Taliban were included in the Battle for Tora Bora to prevent a north-south conflict from 
defining the post-Taliban political landscape. One of these groups was the small non-
Pashtun Pashai tribe which from the Jalalabad area, which had fought with the Northern 
Alliance against the Taliban. Its senior commander, General Hazrat Ali, was given 
command of the Tora Bora operation. Despite his Northern Alliance background, 
however, Hazrat Ali seems to have played an equivocal and indeed obstructive role 
because he was given a hefty bribe of $300,000 by bin Laden.86 Instead of pressing the 
fight and completing the destruction of Taliban forces tribal and personal rivalries 
complicated the situation the incomplete success at Tora Bora was due to the complex 
relationship between American and NA US forces. Rivalries between the various militia 
groups created rifts in the alliance and made command and control difficult. In fact, 
diplomacy became the primary means of persuading the Afghan chieftains to work 
together and move toward a common purpose. Airpower cannot solve these types of 
political problems on the ground. 
Furthermore, at some points in the battle, diplomatic skills were not enough to 
keep the alliance together and the individual leaders began acting unilaterally. Given the 
poor relations between the two primary commanders, Ali and Zaman, it is somewhat 
surprising that operations went as well as they did because of the jockeying for political 
position in the alliance.87 The opportunities that al-Qaeda were given to surrender88 
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demonstrates that the Afghan Model does not exist in a political vacuum, nor does it 
follow a linear path. It is plain that lifting this strategy and implanting it onto other 
campaigns will have significant issues. That is why I hypothesize that the Afghan Model 
is better utilized against a middle tier conventional army fielded by a nation-state because 
it is much less likely to be hindered by tribal allegiances. 
Mazar e Sharif 
The capabilities of the Afghan Model and airpower were displayed in the battle of 
Mazar e Sharif, but it also showed that the Afghan Model should be used in more 
conventional situations. Also, it demonstrates that when choosing allies, it is preferable to 
partner with one group at a time to avoid political complications. This allowed the 
synergy between a cohesive political mission, ground forces for airpower to exploit. 
Mazar e Sharif was viewed as a valuable strategic location as a logistical center.89 In 
early November, eager to secure the city and the airfields before winter set in, special 
forces and Northern Alliance units had two 15,000-pound BLU-82 “Daisy Cutter” bombs 
dropped from a cargo plane on the Taliban position.90 Although, an extreme example, it 
“epitomized the US military’s ability to make a huge impact on the battlefield with a 
small force.91” Schroen also argues that, airpower proved decisive in enabling the 
Northern Alliance to defeat the Taliban in northern Afghanistan in 2001.92 This was a 
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more conventional situation, which created a situation where the synergy between the 
ground and air could be exploited without interference of tribal politics. 
Many also point to a well-coordinated cavalry charge at Mazar e Sharif as another 
example of this phenomenon.93 US and Northern Alliance forces planned to break a 
resilient Taliban line using air strikes on the Taliban frontline followed by a charge from 
Northern Alliance cavalrymen. There was some misunderstanding about the exact timing 
of the air strikes, so the Northern Alliance began their charge right as the bombs landed, 
“emerged, literally, out of the smoke, riding down on the enemy through clouds of dust 
and flying shrapnel. A few carried RPGs, some had less than ten rounds of ammunition in 
their guns-but they rode boldly--Americans and Afghans--into tank, mortar, artillery and 
sniper fire”. 94 This dichotomy of the conduct of war gives an impression of 
invulnerability, but when one looks past the excitement of the story, it becomes apparent 
that this occurred because it was used in a particular range of conflict. 
Debating the Afghan Model 
The use of special forces fighting alongside indigenous forces, combined with 
airpower has been dubbed the “Afghan Model”.95 There is a divergence of opinion on 
who deserves the credit and how revolutionary this new type of warfare is. Some like 
Andres, Wills, and Griffith argue that the vast technological and operational leaps within 
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the US military made airpower and a handful of special operations forces just as deadly, 
yet more efficient than multiple divisions of ground forces.96 They argue that this strategy 
should be utilized more frequently to avoid over extension and the appearance of 
imperialism.  
Moreover, the Afghan Model could redefine US foreign policy, according to this 
argument. Hostile regimes could be toppled and replaced in a matter of months, rapidly 
reshaping world order and tipping the international balance of power even more towards 
the US. The perspective that believes the Afghan Model is a revolutionary leap forward 
suggest that airpower, special forces, and indigenous troops, even those with relatively 
little training, form a powerful and robust combination.97 They believe that the Afghan 
Model is repeatable because airpower is so overwhelming of defending forces, like the 
Taliban, that they cannot mount any sustainable defense. Also, the destructive capabilities 
of airpower negate any potential lack of technical military skills from the allies in 
question. Again, the Afghan model uses “U.S. airpower to degrade enemy 
communications throughout the theater of war. Then, U.S. special forces use light 
indigenous troops as a screen against enemy infantry and force the enemy to mass before 
calling in precision air strikes.”98  
They also argue that airpower is so effective because the Taliban and the Northern 
Alliance had been deadlocked in a stalemate for so long. Once American firepower 
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became part of the equation, the stalemate broke in favor of the American-backed 
Northern Alliance. It presents a conundrum of concentrating to defend the ground assault 
or dispersing to hide from airpower. Andres, Wills, and Griffith point to news reports and 
commentary from experts in late October of 2001 that cast doubt on the course of the 
war. The media began to use terms such as “stalemate” and “quagmire” to describe the 
conflict. Robert Pape, the famed airpower theorist and historian even suggested that the 
reliance on airpower may not be working.99  
On October 21st, 2001, special forces called in close air support as part of the 
Northern Alliance effort to capture Mazar-e-Sharif. The sequence of events and the rapid 
improvement once airpower and special forces were teamed up prove to the proponents 
that the Afghan Model is a paradigm altering strategy. They argue once airpower entered 
the equation, the Taliban’s forces were now confronted with the choice of concentrating 
their forces to fight or dispersing to avoid detection. If they dispersed, they would be 
overrun. If they concentrated, then air strikes would make quick work of them.  
Proponents further point to more successes once special forces and airpower were 
teamed up, the Taliban quickly lost ground through November given that Bai Beche was 
captured on the fifth, Mazar-e-Sharif on the tenth, Kabul on the thirteenth, and Kunduz 
on the twenty-sixth of October. Given the lightning advance through a variety of terrains 
with little logistical support, it would appear as if this new military strategy could do 
away with an entire military tradition.  
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An Expansive Perspective of the Afghan Model 
Andres, Wills, and Griffith point to the synergy between airpower, special forces, 
and indigenous forces as the source of the potency of the Afghan Model. This is not 
problematic until proponents assign it a strategic value and argue that it can answer any 
strategic problem presented in military foreign policy. They argue that “… the Afghan 
model has proven capable of defeating both conventional and guerrilla forces. When the 
proxy forces' limitations are recognized and considered in planning operations, the model 
is replicable under substantially different conditions and has shown itself to work even 
when less skilled proxy forces are deployed against more skilled enemies and when 
proxy forces have little or no political motivation to fight for U.S. goals. Examining only 
the tactical issues associated with the new model, however, obscures its true value.”100 
In fact, the Afghan Model’s performance dropped significantly when Taliban and 
al-Qaeda fighters adopted hit and run tactics compared to the days of early October when 
the Taliban had established front lines and when the political situation became 
ambiguous. One need look no further than the Battle of Tora Bora. 
The claim is that the synergy between airpower, special forces, and indigenous 
forces, regardless of skill or political allegiance, is too much for any adversary to 
overcome. Another important claim that the trio claim is that the organization of the 
enemy is irrelevant to the outcome. They argue this is the case because the Afghan Model 
allows the US military to bring the most violent physical systems at little relative cost to 
the nation as whole. That is not to diminish the sacrifice of US service members, but 
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rather a comparison to conflicts that utilized large numbers of ground forces, like in 
Vietnam and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Moreover, it allows US forces and indigenous 
allies to take risks that larger conventional forces could not take.101 Secondly, they argue 
that because large numbers of American forces were not on the ground, an insurgency did 
not develop. This has proved not to be true for reasons entirely unrelated to the Afghan 
Model.  
In summation, the proponents argue that “planners must consider the model as a 
primary option, rather than an emergency procedure”.102 This conclusion is faulty 
because it disregards the balance of skill between allies and enemies, but also it ignores 
the overall conflict intensity and type. 
A Limited Perspective on the Afghan Model 
The Afghan Model is not a revolution and it is not a “one size fits all” military 
strategy. Obviously, the Afghan Model will not succeed against a near-peer rival as 
Andres, Wills, and Griffith admit.103 It is only a new operational concept in a specific 
range of conflict intensity and political reality. 104 It also requires at least somewhat 
skilled allies. I concur with Biddle’s conclusion that allies need skill and political 
motivation, but I also argue that there is a range of conflict intensity that the Afghan 
Model will work in. Moreover, the Afghan Model should not be relied upon if an enemy 
is likely to devolve into an insurgency, like the Taliban. 
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Merely attaching any group to a special forces unit and expecting them to take 
territory regardless of relative combat skill and experience is problematic. One of the 
primary objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom was to topple the Taliban regime. 
The Northern Alliance always had toeholds and there were always ethnic enclaves that 
the Taliban could not reach. As discussed, it was a tactical stalemate. Pushing out of these 
enclaves and toppling the Taliban requires advancing, taking, and holding territory and 
that means allied forces must have skill parity. The crucial task of the NA was to take 
ground from the Taliban. If taking ground were not necessary, then bombing alone would 
be asked to carry out the mission and therefore the Afghan Model would be a moot 
point.105 The situation called for a synergy between forces and without capable force on 
the ground, the effort would have fallen flat. 
Clearly, the Afghan Model has some characteristics of a barstool. If one leg is 
significantly weaker than the other two, the stool will fall apart. It can only thrive in a 
specific set of circumstances. As mentioned, the situation pre-2001 was defined by 
stalemate. A stalemate means that the two sides are prepared positions, and either side on 
the offensive would need the technical skills to solve that tactical puzzle. As Biddle 
points out, taking ground requires some competency. One must utilize cover, 
concealment, and suppression of the enemy to push forward. 106 Simply charging enemy 
positions after bombardment does not guarantee success, as some might suggest. The 
battlefields of the Western Front in the First World War can attest to this. Andres, Wills, 
and Griffith argue that air strikes targeting reserves and supplies make defense 
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impossible, but again if attacking allies lack basic skills and cannot advance, then an 
attack on rear elements is a waste of expensive munitions. The course of the conflict also 
demonstrates that the relative balance of skill between allies and foes does not show that 
the Afghan Model can work across the conflict intensity spectrum.  
The conflict between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban and their al-Qaeda 
partners did not feature two standardized, professional forces, but rather a mix of well-
trained and motivated and untrained and poorly motivated combatants on each side. 
Often, how they mixed and which groups came into contact determined outcomes, not 
airpower. The Taliban forces were comprised of mostly Pashtun seasonal volunteers, 
foreign fighters with some tactical skills, and the well-motivated foreigners who had 
trained in Al-Qaeda camps. These fighters were often trained basic infantry skills and 
used as such.107  
The Northern Alliance had a similar construction. They often utilized young men 
from their particular ethnic regions, but featured some veterans from the long civil war 
that understood basic fire and maneuver skills.108 Obviously, their high-end forces 
compromised American special forces units. When the Taliban put their least skilled 
forces in the front, they did not pick concealed positions and thus, they were easily 
identified.109 One example personifies this phenomenon at the fighting around Bishqab in 
late October 2001, when NA commanders witness positions that had checked every 
attack against it was vaporized by a 2,000-pound bomb.110  
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Clearly, the Afghan Model works well against amateurs, but things changed once 
the war progressed and the Taliban put the well-trained Al-Qaeda volunteers into forward 
positions. Infantry forces that stand against the horizon on hilltops are easy to spot 
without advanced imaging devices, but the Taliban adopted cover and concealment 
techniques and dispersal strategies by November 2001. The devastating effects of 
American air strikes were minimized and this became apparent during the attack on Tora 
Bora and Operation Anaconda. 111 
This demonstrates that there is a military skill ceiling for the Afghan Model and 
given that more experienced fighters that had received basic training could hold their 
ground even facing heavy bombardment.112 Also, when the Taliban behaved as a 
conventional force would, holding a specific line, they were vulnerable to air strikes. 
When they behaved as an insurgency, airpower was less effective. Some, like Wright 
attribute this to technical limitations, claiming that technological improvements in 
surveillance with the onset of UAVs, which provided quicker reaction times and longer 
loiter times than manned platforms. The Taliban could be under nearly continuous 
surveillance and thus faster tasking for airstrikes. 113 This still does not mean that 
American forces had total control because certain effective Taliban elements held ground 
in multiple instances.  
Moreover, the hope that the final technical revolution is just around the corner has 
always been the claim, yet systems fail, radios break, or something is caught up in the fog 
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of war. During Operation Anaconda in March 2002, the battlefield was a ten-by-ten-
kilometer area focused on with every available surveillance asset, yet fewer than half of 
al-Qaeda positions were identified prior to ground engagement. Most fire that US forces 
encountered came from unseen positions that Western ground forces had to deal with in 
close quarters engagements. 114 Operation Enduring Freedom also failed to achieve one of 
the primary objectives, the capture or death of Osama bin-Laden. It is impossible to ask 
special forces to call in air support and maintain a perimeter around rugged, mountainous 
terrain is an impossible task and relying on Afghan militias, who may not share the same 
political objectives as the US.115 Understanding the effectiveness of the Afghan Model 
goes far beyond technological capabilities. It involves the balance of forces and a range 
of conflict intensity. 
Conclusions About the Invasion of Afghanistan 
The Afghan Model is not a one-off, but it most certainly is not a paradigm altering 
strategy. As the successes of the early days of the campaign and certain failures at Tora 
Bora and Operation Anaconda reveal truths beyond the standard debate about the 
preconditions that the Afghan Model requires. Yes, the political allegiance and relative 
skill of allies is important, but the Afghan Model can only work in a certain range of 
conflict intensity and against certain enemies. At the far right of the intensity range is a 
nuclear exchange and at the far left are limited guerrilla activities on a local scale. To 
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reiterate, the Afghan Model will not work against a near-peer rival in a high intensity 
conflict.  
The War in Afghanistan is an interesting case because it had elements of 
conventional and unconventional conflict, which is why occasionally, the synergy 
between airpower, special forces, and indigenous allies proved to be an unstoppable force 
against previously impenetrable Taliban lines. When the more experienced Taliban and 
al-Qaeda members adopted more tactics one would associate with an insurgency, the 
Afghan Mode proved less effective, like the fighting on Highway 4 in December of 2011 
and at Tora Bora.116 Andres, Wills, and Griffith and other proponents of the Afghan 
Model are correct in stating that conventional forces are vulnerable because they have 
exposed reserves and supply lines. They are incorrect in the assertion that that the mere 
addition of precision airpower into the equation changes the outcome of the conflict. As 
demonstrated, when trained forces utilized cover and concealment, airpower was much 
less effective. The forces that used cover and concealment were veteran Taliban and al-
Qaeda fighters were the ones that fled into Pakistan and formed the seeds of the 
insurgency that persists today. Using airpower without a major ground effort against a 
side that is likely to disperse and transform into an insurgency, which airpower is not 
suited to fight against. The Taliban and al-Qaeda wanted to draw the US into a larger 
conflict and use the same strategies that they did against the Soviets, which explains their 
use of cover and concealment beyond a mere tactical advantage. They are primarily a 
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guerrilla group and airpower cannot effectively target such a strategy. The Model works 
well against conventional forces and that is the way it should be utilized.  
Using the Afghan Model on low-to-middle range conventional adversaries makes 
the most strategic sense for the United States. Conventional forces, created by a nation-
state, are easier to target and special forces are more adept at direct action and other 
mission types against set objectives and pieces of military infrastructure. It is also easier 
to organize a united front of indigenous allies against a conventional force. Conventional 
forces fielded by a nation-state are likely to not create the conflicting ethnic interests that 
caused problems at Tora Bora and during Operation Anaconda. 
The Afghan Model demonstrated that in the right situation and against the right 
adversary, the synergy between airpower and ground forces “demonstrated a level of 
flexibility, accuracy, and power exceeding any previous war.”117 Yet, overemphasizing 
technology and targeting, will distract from the real lessons of the conflict. 118 When the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda adopted insurgency-like tactics, airpower became much less 
effective. Yet, earlier in the conflict, when the Taliban used conventional tactics, the 
Northern Alliance could take advantage of the tactical conundrum of concentrating to 
fight or dispersing to avoid air strikes. The fight went better when the complex tribal 
politics were left out of the equation when it was one group fighting against another 
instead of putting different groups in situations that would test their allegiances. I 
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hypothesize that the Afghan Model should only be used against middle tier, conventional 
foes. This would also alleviate the political conundrum. In part because the US would not 
need to work as hard to get basing or flyover rights and because it is easier to choose 
allies against a state as opposed to an ethnic group. Moreover, this should not be 
considered a transformative event for defense politics because it is geared to small 
nation-states, which do not pose a major threat to American interests. If American 
defense posture is geared to a major power conflict, then conducting a war in the image 
of the Afghan Model will be less complicated. 
Chapter Four: Comparing Kosovo and Libya 
In the absence of another great power to challenge the United States since the fall 
of the Soviet Union, the US has been free to use its military muscle to maintain 
international order. Airpower has been the preferred tool for multiple administrations as it 
is more politically palatable than putting American soldiers on the ground. The Kosovo 
and Libya air campaigns bear much in similar, despite being twelve years apart. They 
were both joint US/European operations that targeted authoritarian regimes under the 
auspice of humanitarian intervention to prevent ethnic cleansing.  
There are claims that Kosovo was a unanimous victory for airpower, but there are 
numerous skeptics. Skeptics argue that airpower did not change Milosevic’s mind, but 
harmed civilians, which was against the objective of the mission. Libya is often 
denounced for uncorking civil strife and disorder within Libya. I disagree with these 
sentiments because the use of airpower was about shaping the regional order to fit into 
the Western vision, led by the United States. The realist perspective of international 
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relations advises that one examine conflict as a state versus state affair. Intervention and 
the use of airpower did not necessarily change the political calculus of either Ghaddafi or 
Milosevic, but it changed their political realities. Expecting authoritarian leaders to bend 
at the first sight of American intervention would be a foolish assumption. Airpower was 
not the exacting tool it was advertised to be. Political control comes from the people and 
airpower does not gain hegemony over a population.  
The use of airpower in both situations was to facilitate a regime change and from 
this perspective, each was a limited success, because ultimately the regime fell. The 
overarching question, which goes beyond the scope of this paper, is does America want 
this to be its primary strategy of coercive foreign policy? What could have changed the 
outcomes of both campaigns was picking a different moment to intervene. Perhaps if a 
more established and unified opposition to Ghaddafi rose quickly, then the outcome 
would be radically different. Airpower should not be viewed as a solution in statecraft, 
but a mechanism. Airpower was used to create political instability, so future campaigns 
against such regimes ought to target what legitimizes their power and existence. Anarchy 
is what one makes of it. 
In this chapter, I first examine the origins of the Kosovo conflict. It is necessary to 
understand the circumstances around Operation Allied Force (OAF). Understanding these 
circumstances is necessary to evaluating the outcome in Kosovo. Then, I will examine 
the arguments surrounding the Kosovo intervention. Subsequently, I will discuss the 
historical similarities between the Kosovo and Libya campaigns and interpret their 
significance. Finally, I will determine how successful the Libya campaign was in 
comparison to Kosovo. 
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Origins of Kosovo Conflict 
Kosovo is a landlocked country with no strategic resources, which begs the 
question, why was Serbia bent on keeping it? Kosovo is considered to be cradle of the 
Serbian nation and identity, but changing demographics put the Serbian claim of 
ownership at risk. 119 The Kosovar Albanian population was steadily increasing, while the 
Serbian population was decreasing, especially in the Kosovo province. Politics cannot 
change demographics and the shifting balance in favor of the Albanians would threaten 
the established political order for Milosevic. To this end, he limited the rights of 
Albanians to encourage migration as an artificial balance against the changing 
demographics.120  
Consequently, Kosovar Albanians organized to move towards referendum 
through peaceful means. Dr. Ibrahim Rugova organized a referendum that showed an 
overwhelming majority desired Kosovar independence and adopted a strategy of non-
violence in the spirit of Gandhi and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. They believed this would 
gain international attention and pressure Milosevic into change.121 In response, Milosevic 
cracked down harder on Kosovo and consequently, the peace movement lost sway to a 
more militant wing. 
                                                 
119 Freedman, Lawrence. “Victims and Victors: Reflections on the Kosovo War.” Review of International 
Studies, vol. 26, no. 3, 2000, pp. 335–358., www.jstor.org/stable/20097683. 
120 Freedman, 346 
121 Nagl, John, and Octavian Manea. “The Uncomfortable Wars of the 1990s.” War, Strategy and History: 
Essays in Honour of Professor Robert O’Neill, edited by DANIEL MARSTON and TAMARA LEAHY, 
ANU Press, Acton, Australia, 2016, pp. 127–154, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1dgn5sf.15. 
 68 
The Milosevic regime in Belgrade can be described as “soft authoritarian”.122 
Post-Soviet Yugoslavia had some elements of democracy, but without the veto points of a 
well-developed democracy.123 The elections that legitimized his rule were competitive, 
but not fair.124 He utilized constitutional rules that allowed him to bypass a popular 
election in favor of a legislative vote to extend his presidency to a third term and this 
adherence to constitutionalism, although minimal, made the regime fragile.125 
Many point to the Dayton Accords as the birth of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) because these accords affirmed Milosevic’s authority, which therefore denied 
Rugova’s pacifist strategy.126 The KLA instead adopted violence. Formed in 1991, it only 
gained serious traction in 1996 after the Dayton Accords. As a separatist group, its means 
of waging war against another state was minimal, but the theft of light weaponry made a 
small insurgency possible.127 The KLA captured a third of the province by attacking 
lightly defended police stations. The US government considered the KLA to be a terror 
group and a disruptor to order in the region, as Milosevic was viewed as the “guarantor of 
peace” in the region. 128 Already it is apparent that the US viewed Balkan instability as a 
threat to order that needed a solution. Moreover, the KLA was a weak group that could 
not alter the political realities on their own. Even at the end of the conflict, when Serbian 
forces were weaker than at the beginning, the KLA still posed no real threat to the 
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Serbian military. The KLA did not have one recorded offensive military success.129 So, to 
garner international attention, they would need to draw in the Serbian military. They 
accomplished this and achieved international recognition when Serbian forces committed 
atrocities in Racak, where the bodies of 45 farmers, including children were 
uncovered.130 
It is necessary to understand Milosevic’s strategy if one wants to evaluate the 
coercive nature of the air campaign. The demographic realities meant that if Milosevic 
wanted to keep control of the province, demographics would need to change. The way a 
state can do this is through ethnic cleansing. From a military perspective, ethnic cleansing 
is not a taxing operation. It only requires lightly armed soldiers or militiamen to evict 
people from their homes and herd them away. The KLA attacks gave Milosevic the 
reason to go into Kosovo and conduct ethnic cleansing and do it under the international 
principle of sovereignty because he would argue that he was putting down a rebellion in 
his own territory. Also, Milosevic was putting down a rebellion, not trying to win the 
political favor of the Kosovars. It was not possible to repress a majority ethnic group, so 
instead of attempting to separate the population from the guerillas, as basic counter-
insurgency doctrine dictates, Milosevic wanted to remove the Kosovars and regain the 
demographic advantage. 131 In short, the Serbian objective was to retain Kosovo. The 
strategy to achieve this was to eliminate the KLA as a force that could harm Serbian 
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interests and to remake the ethnic balance in Kosovo. 132The Serbian strategy was to deny 
the KLA any local sources of support because if the insurgency were left to fester, a 
potential Kosovar Albanian state could arise and present perpetual conflict.133 It is widely 
known that conflict begets the exodus of people, so the Serbs hoped a US/NATO 
intervention would help accelerate the exodus. The objective was to create a situation in 
Kosovo would not pose a reasonable threat to Serb interest and Kosovo to remain 
docile.134  
NATO’s Perspective 
At its core, NATO is a defensive alliance designed to deter major conflict 
between the Soviets and allied Europe. But on the 50th anniversary of the alliance’s 
formation, the Soviet Union no longer existed and the new Russian Federation did not 
pose a threat to Europe. If NATO proved inept at preventing the same actions such as 
packing women and children into trains to be shipped away that denoted the Holocaust, 
then what was the point of the organization existing anyways? In the post-Soviet world, 
NATO would also need to prove that it could still be a credible actor against aggression 
as it was formed as a defensive alliance against the Soviets. The alliance also needed to 
prove they could still credibly wield their collective saber. NATO hoped to use airpower 
to coerce Milosevic that achieving his goal was impossible and that continuing the ethnic 
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cleansing would be counterproductive for his regime. The track to conflict was set into 
place. 
Operation Allied Force 
The Clinton Administration’s stated objectives for the use of airpower in Kosovo 
were: “demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to aggression, deter 
Milosevic’s continuing and escalating attacks in Kosovo, and to damage Serbia’s 
capacity to wage war in the future”.135 NATO needed to maintain its credibility as an 
alliance and as the main force of stabilization in the region. This clearly shows that the 
mission was not about humanitarian intervention, but rather regional order. The stated 
objectives are all framed in a way that pertains to state conflict. This influences how one 
should consider the success of the use of airpower. Airpower, as a strategy, serves this 
end well because it does not entail decisive military action.136 It changes the political 
realities of other regimes and actors. The end goal of the use of force was, without doubt, 
to weaken the Milosevic regime because undercutting the capacity to wage war also 
hinders the capacity for the monopoly on violence, the Weberian definition of statehood.  
Attacks on the elements of stability in a developing state can be coercive because 
internal security is often the primary concern of these regimes. 137 NATO ultimately 
accomplished this, not through attacks on the military, but on Milosevic’s supporters. The 
goal of the use of airpower was to make Belgrade end their aggressive actions at the 
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negotiating table.138 As history has shown, the Kosovars returned to their homes, 
Milosevic came to the bargaining table, and his regime ultimately collapsed. Milosevic 
proved himself to be a serious barrier to regional stability and a threat to NATO unity in 
terms of Greco-Turkish competition, so the campaign was successful.  
Gen. Klaus Naumann, who chaired the NATO alliance's military committee, 
declared NATO's intention "to loosen his grip on power and break his will to 
continue."139 Stating that the objective was to “loosen his grip on power” clearly indicates 
that human rights were in the background and that this was a mission to facilitate regime 
change. From this perspective, the operation was successful. 
Proponent Arguments 
As stated in the introduction, I do not argue that airpower alone forced Milosevic 
and the Serbians to stand down. This too was the case for Qaddafi in Libya in 2011. 
Instead, I offer that this campaign was a limited success because it created an untenable 
situation for Milosevic to survive politically if he chose to continue, which does fall in 
line with statements made by US and NATO officials. Classical understanding of 
airpower, which theorizes that airpower alone can determine the political outcome, 
categorizes airpower into three categories: punishment, denial, and decapitation. Lake, 
among others, argues that these categories do not conceptualize airpower properly. I 
concur that the classical categorization of airpower into punishment, denial, and 
decapitation do not sufficiently comprehend the political realities surrounding the use of 
                                                 
138Byman, Daniel L., and Matthew C. Waxman. "Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate." International 
Security 24.4 (2000): 5-38. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web, 16 
139 Michael R. Gordon, "NATO Plans Weeks of Bombing to Break Grip of Serb Leader," New York Times, 
April 1, 1999, p. Al 
 73 
airpower140. Punishment is the attempt to bomb civilian areas with the objective of 
inciting a revolt or collapse of the will to fight. Denial targets the military of an enemy 
state, rendering them incapable of defense and therefore susceptible to an enemy state’s 
will. Decapitation refers to attacking leadership elements141. I also argue that the new 
categories are only useful when understood as part of a comprehensive strategy 
The proponents of the Kosovo campaign argue that the air campaign was 
undermining his political support among the elites that supported the regime.142. 
Although Lake is a skeptic of airpower in Kosovo, he demonstrates its limited success. 
He argues that the denial strategy, targeting Milosevic’s was a failure. Instead, he argues 
that the direct pressure, which threatens constituents and their property, combined with 
weakening, the threats to prosperity of the state143, were what caused Milosevic to 
capitulate. Targeting these specific nodes of his power structure changed his political 
reality and forced him to end the attacks on Kosovo. 
It is necessary to understand what parts of the Milosevic regime were attacked to 
hypothesize about the overall effectiveness of airpower as a tool of foreign policy. One 
needs to categorize the different uses of airpower on a strategic level to evaluate it. The 
new typology Lake introduces carries great significance for understanding the 
consequences of the conflict and airpower. The typology that Lake uses144 includes 
denial, direct pressure, weakening, and political destabilization. Denial utilizes threats to 
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“make it difficult, if not impossible, for the target to achieve its objectives”.145 The 
objective is to make the target reconsider its political objectives.146. Denial seeks to 
degrade the military capabilities of an enemy state’s military capabilities to make 
achieving an objective impossible, thus altering the political reality.147 Some argue that 
Milosevic capitulated because of a threat of a US/NATO ground action, but there was 
little real political momentum from the US or other NATO partners.148 The Clinton 
Administration routinely came out against ground action and Congress required its 
authorization before ground forces could be used.149 The US military was also weary of 
getting bogged down into the Yugoslav mountains, which stymied the Germans for 
years.150. Also, an assault on Belgrade would put civilian at risk, when airpower would 
not put US ground forces at risk. The use of a denial strategy would include the 
reasonable threat of ground forces, for which there is no credible evidence, according to 
Lake.  
Direct pressure threatens to place costs on the enemy state’s leadership as a way 
to change the calculus of its policy.151 NATO did not seriously pursue attacks on 
Milosevic. The only instance of attacking his person was an early April airstrike on a 
residence he used, but other command, control, communications, and intelligence 
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outposts were part of the sortie.152 This target list further demonstrates that the objective 
was to weaken Milosevic’s capacity for control and the consequence would be his ouster. 
Also, avoiding targeting Milosevic directly also shows a confidence that targeting his 
other sources of power would facilitate his capitulation and political demise. 
Lake proposes that weakening “relies on the threats if aggregate damage to a 
state’s national prosperity and power to convince the target leadership to change 
policy”153. Attacking a state’s economic means of function does more than chip away at 
the means of building a war machine. When people are put out of work and daily lives 
are disrupted, then support for the leadership can be eroded. Then, the regime may lose 
the confidence of the people and collapse. When NATO and US attacks on Serbian 
infrastructure after the initial attacks on pure military infrastructure did not produce the 
desired result, the target list expanded to mixed civilian infrastructure.  
The Serbian military was conducting ethnic cleansing, which does not require the 
use of heavy, easily identifiable forces. Rather it requires just light infantry. The US and 
NATO made quick work of the significant military infrastructure like command and 
control elements and airfields. 154 In fact, final estimates conclude that only 7-10% of the 
heavy Serbian forces in Kosovo were destroyed. 155When this occurred, it put over 
100,000 civilians out of work when their places of employment were destroyed and 
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500,000 more lost their jobs because they were subcontracted. 156Clearly, Milosevic was 
more susceptible to the collapse of popular support rather than a military defeat. Kosovo 
was the poorest province in Yugoslavia and the general population’s suffering for a 
province that did not serve a strategic benefit or economic one would quickly change 
public opinion about Milosevic. 
Sanctions had already done significant harm to the Serbian economy, but what 
changed was who the bombing affected As Lake notes, Milosevic was not concerned 
about the damage to the military because Serbia faced no external threats, but economic 
damage did concern him. 157 The Serbian economy was an oligarchy and the elites of 
society had control of most the economy and therefore they supported his regime and the 
threats to their prosperity did threaten him.158 One such example of this was in May of 
1999, NATO attacked the Serbian electrical grid with CBU-102 bombs designed to 
destroy the grid systems and then later attacked the generation stations.159 This lowered 
Serbia’s economic output 50% after the war.160 This would directly affect his backers and 
make them question supporting him. The use of airpower did not directly bend Milosevic, 
but it clearly created a situation where his regime was no longer tenable. 
The fourth and final category, destabilization is what Lake credits with the 
undoing of the Milosevic regime. Destabilization “threatens a leader’s ability to retain 
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power”.161The older airpower doctrine would classify it as punishment and NATO’s 
targeting of the non-military economic pieces of Milosevic’s regime fits this category 
well. Milosevic relied on Serbian economic elites of about 100 families for support in the 
legislatures and when the NATO bombing began to destroy their wealth for a cause they 
did not fervently believe in, the Milosevic regime began to unravel. After the initial 
bombing on the Serbian military did not force him to change strategy, the target list was 
opened up to include the Serbian economy. 162 After a month, through May of 1999, 
“elite discontent became visible”.163  
The economic elites had no stake in Kosovo, yet were suffering greatly from 
Milosevic’s actions there. Concurrently, NATO tightened ranks about the need for 
Milosevic to go and Russia punted on Milosevic having any further backing. 164 This 
weakening fed into political destabilization.  
Although OAF did not intentionally seek to undermine Milosevic through 
attacking his political support, it did. The use of airpower created a situation where 
Milosevic could no longer maintain his legitimacy not because he was weakened 
militarily, but because his political support fell out. It helped that Russia obfuscated on 
his diplomatic support, but the key mechanism that buckled under airpower was his 
economic support. Airpower was not successful in Kosovo because it simply shocked 
Milosevic into capitulation. He remarked to US diplomats that “you will bomb us”. 
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Ultimately, airpower created an untenable situation for his rule to continue and a similar 
pattern occurs in Libya. 
Kosovo Dissent 
Dynamic and exciting technology often fails to live up to its promises and some 
argue that Milosevic’s capitulation had nothing to do with US/NATO bombing, but rather 
it was the. Some, like Conrad Crane, argue that the bombing of dual-use facilities did not 
pressure Milosevic and failed to coerce as intended. 165 At the onset of OAF, the Clinton 
Administration expected airpower to destroy Milosevic’s forces, thus curtailing the 
ability to conduct ethnic cleansing.  
Given that the target list had to be expanded to include dual-use facilities, 
airpower could not fulfill its promises. This postulation mistakes the nature of 
Milosevic’s strategy and the desired outcome. Again, ethnic cleansing does not require a 
massive military effort, so it is difficult to pick apart from the air. Given that there were 
only 26 tanks were to have been confirmed destroyed, many point to this as a failure of 
airpower. 166  The decision to use force and the continued use of force represents an 
attempt to undercut the Milosevic regime. Given that he threatened Greco-Turkish 
stability within NATO and the overall stability of the region, it was an assault on the 
overall stability of Belgrade. 167 
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Crane argues that “The Kosovo campaign thus featured anew many of the 
persistent shortcomings of American airpower. Gauging the decision-making process, 
vulnerabilities and will of targeted leaders again proved difficult”.168 Given that NATO 
went after the economic base, it is clear that removing Milosevic was the ultimate 
objective. A state does not attack another’s base of power unless it means to facilitate 
political collapse. There is also the persisting claim about the Clinton Doctrine and that 
the war was about humanitarian norms.169 
Dissenters, like Crane, also point to the threat of a US/NATO invasion and 
diplomatic efforts that ultimately pushed Milosevic to end his operations in Kosovo. 
They also argue that the strategy of imposed costs and destruction of dual use facilities 
were not the deciding factors, as others, including then Pentagon spokesman Kenneth 
Bacon and other academics claim. 170 Perhaps dissidents are too distracted by the claims 
of bloodless war and even as Crane readily admits, “bombs destroy bridges, not build 
them”.171 The intent of stopping ethnic cleansing was noble, but as the realist paradigm 
directs observers to look past these explanations and understand conflict as the affair of 
nation-states. 
The most frequently cited alternative explanation to airpower is the threat of a 
US/NATO invasion. 172 Serbian GNP had been cut in half through the decade preceding 
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OAF, so they could not be further damaged. This does not take into account that the 
economy was geared towards elites and once their sources of income were damaged or 
destroyed, then their political support of Milosevic would crumble. At the time, the US 
and UK deployed 35,000 troops to Albania and began work on widening supply roads 
there. The UK also called up 30,000 reservists.173 Pape points to the evidence that Russia 
attempted to put Russian soldiers in Serbia as a deterrent to NATO action, but the fact 
that it never occurred is argued as proof that the Russians took the NATO threat 
seriously. This runs counter to statements that then Secretary of State Madeline Albright 
made to the Republican members of Congress that “I can assure you that the United 
States would not support ground options”.174 Also, before the bombing began at the 
Rambouillet Conference, there was no mention of a US/NATO ground action. 175  
Russia’s decision to withdraw diplomatic support for Milosevic is also an oft cited 
reason for Milosevic to capitulate. As Hosmer points out, Russia had been Serbia’s 
principle ally, but abandoned it and sided with the NATO position. When this occurred, 
on June 2, Russian envoy Victor Chernomyrdin, made this clear and Milosevic ceased 
operations within several hours. 176 Some argue that this is additional proof to the 
credibility of the US/NATO invasion because Yeltsin would be sacrificing a staunch ally 
in an important region, thus signaling Russian impotence in the new world order. 177 This 
is despite statements from US elected officials and General Wesley Clark that the air war 
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"was an effort to coerce, not to seize”178. Moreover, it was never mentioned during 
negotiations in private back-channel communications with State Department officials.179 
Finally, it is more likely that the Russians merely viewed Milosevic as no longer worth 
the effort or diplomatic risk. Milosevic endorsed a coup against Gorbachev in 1991, 
which reportedly soured his relationship with Yeltsin.180 Milosevic was getting in the 
way of moving past the Cold War and into a new era between the US and Russia. 
Milosevic ran out of allies as he reneged on promises too many times. 181 The decision 
was made to use airpower to unseat Milosevic because he threatened order in the region. 
Libya and Operation Odyssey Dawn 
When the Arab Spring kicked off with revolution in Tunisia in December 2010, 
the desire for political change swept across the region. The calls for change and 
expressions of discontent spread to and metastasized within Libya. These calls for 
freedom and reform posed a threat to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. The ensuing 
protest turned to revolt, which threatened his regime. Qaddafi threatened to cleanse those 
who opposed him. The air campaigns against Milosevic and Serbia and Qaddafi and 
Libya bear much in common. They were both soft authoritarian regimes seeking to quash 
a threat to their rule and legitimacy that were undone by a US/NATO air campaign. The 
situations surrounding the respective campaigns and the similar final outcomes have 
implications for the use of airpower as a military-political strategy. Without airpower in 
either situation, Qaddafi and Milosevic, would have conducted an ethnic cleansing and 
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would probably have remained in power for the foreseeable future. The humanitarian 
aspects of the campaigns were not the primary motivators for intervention given the 
outcomes of Milosevic losing an election and Qaddafi’s death.  
Qaddafi had long drawn the ire of the US and NATO given the Lockerbie 
bombing and the Berlin nightclub bombing that killed several American service members 
that was tied Qaddafi and precipitated airstrikes on Tripoli and Benghazi.182 By 2011, 
Qaddafi was the last standing threat to American and European interests in the region and 
the longstanding desire to remove him appeared and was given urgency because of his 
promise to massacre civilians. In both cases, the air campaigns represented an 
opportunity to reshape regional order. Without the Soviet Union backing Egypt and other 
regimes in the region, the US and NATO had an opportunity to solidify their presence in 
North Africa.  
Airpower was an effective strategy because it sought a limited objective of 
delegitimizing and undercutting the respective regimes, Kosovo and Libya, showing that 
an alternative path was preferable. Airpower is a limited tool and it presented a way to 
engage in a limited political objective. The same categories of coercion can be used to 
examine both cases. They had limited success because they both sought to achieve 
limited objectives, deposing a regime. The criticism of unsettled and ongoing political 
chaos, particularly in Libya fall outside the objectives of the missions. It was a limited 
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objective without foresight about the political future in part because of the calls for 
democracy.183 
Qaddafi Regime 
Qaddafi headed a single party regime. Libya was a republic ruled in a dictatorial 
fashion by a president. The leadership often comes from the military and Qaddafi often 
used his colonel title as a source of legitimacy. Some attributes that define a single party 
regime was the growth of state power, the capacity to repress, quasi-socialist economics, 
and the power of populism. In both states, the power of the state was vastly stronger than 
that of civil society. Also, both states had the capacity to quash any uprising given the 
pervasive paramilitary and secret police units. State control also extended into the 
economies of both countries and cases In Libya, it was the oil revenues and in Milosevic 
it came to be in the awarding of contracts to a handful of families to buy support. Finally, 
both relied on populism to gain and hold power. Qaddafi claimed that he worked for the 
people’s power and Milosevic railed against bureaucracy in earlier stages of his political 
career.184 Although they went about their politics in different ways, they ended up at 
similar places on the spectrum. The regimes bear important similarities, which means 
they could be coerced similarly 
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Move to War 
Qaddafi lost all regional support when the Arab League endorsed the proposed 
no-fly zone on March 12.185 This is the primary difference between Milosevic and 
Qaddafi because Qaddafi was isolated from the beginning, whereas Milosevic had 
Russia. In the end, they both ended without allies. Early in March, Qaddafi controlled 
every city except Benghazi and was being reinforced by mercenaries.186 His speeches 
about indiscriminate slaughter also stirred the desire for the US to intervene. He 
threatened to put down the rebellion without mercy or pity.187 Mueller argues that it was 
an opportunity to atone for previous missed opportunities to stop other genocides.188  
This does not mesh into the history of the conflict. The US Ambassador to the 
UN, Susan Rice proposed the language in UNSCR 1973, that called for “all necessary 
measures to protect civilians”,189 but this was the legal justification for military action, 
not the casus belli. The opportunity to knock over a weak Qaddafi regime and gain 
stability in North Africa presented itself and the Administration wanted to take it. Russia 
argued this point, but did not exercise its veto power.190 Beyond this, the US now had 
legal backing to use airpower under the auspice of preventing ethnic cleansing. As Owen 
puts it, “the US had a moral imperative and an opportunity to close a festering sore”. 191 It 
was significantly more important to remove Qaddafi, the festering sore, and thus remove 
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the future threat of instability from the perspective of a having a hostile state in an 
important region. 
American Strategy for Qaddafi 
Qaddafi’s political strength and legitimacy came from the ability of his military 
and security services to keep order in Libya. What differentiates the Libya and Kosovo 
interventions were the centers of gravity targeted, but they had the same effect of political 
destabilization. The Libyan rebels were completely outclassed and would be annihilated 
in any conflict against Qaddafi’s forces, so to remove Qaddafi, his military needed to be 
attacked. Whereas Milosevic’s base of support was attacked. Undercutting Qaddafi’s 
military created a situation where his hold on power was no longer tenable and he 
became vulnerable. Milosevic’s government collapsed because of airpower, but Qaddafi 
was killed. That facet of the outcome is not relevant when understanding the role 
airpower plays because the ultimate objective was to facilitate regime change. 
The attacks on Qaddafi’s military represent a denial strategy. The opening salvos 
that targeted his radar and anti-aircraft installations would for the foreseeable future, 
leave his regime at the mercy of any other power. Furthermore, denial targets the capacity 
of a target to achieve military objectives.192 The US/NATO campaign required “planning 
direct action against regime troops advancing on Libyan cities, as well as degrading the 
regime’s ability to continue such attacks by damaging or destroying military facilities, 
equipment, and communications capabilities.”193 A humanitarian operation cannot exist 
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without crippling the capabilities of the adversary state because humanitarian forces are 
soft targets like transport aircraft and helicopters. That is why I discount the humanitarian 
element of the mission. The first missions of the conflict were to cripple Qaddafi’s 
military regime, not support refugees. B-2s launched the opening salvo against military 
assets.194 Moreover, President Obama’s stated objective of protecting civilians meant the 
destruction of Qaddafi’s regime to follow through on protecting civilians.195 The Kosovo 
campaign attempted this by targeting Milosevic’s military, but ethnic cleansing does not 
require heavy forces. The terrain also played a role in this because Milosevic’s forces had 
terrain features to use for cover, but the Libyan coastline has no such features. Also, 
Qaddafi was attempting to put down an insurrection, so he had to use heavier forces to 
overcome the defensive advantage the rebels had. 
There was never any attempt to authorize a ground invasion. It was politically 
unpopular in the United States and would have required Senate authorization. In the same 
way, a ground option was never really on the table for attacking Milosevic either. From 
the onset of both campaigns, it was to be conducted purely through airpower.  
Kosovo and Libya diverge when considering the category of direct pressure 
because as mentioned, there was never a significant push to personally attack Milosevic, 
but Qaddafi represented a threat if he were permitted to persist. Qaddafi’s demise began 
as his convoy was leaving Sirte, when his satellite phone call was intercepted, but was 
intercepted by an RAF Tornado equipped for electronic surveillance. His convoy was 
then hit with a Hellfire from a Predator and strafed by a French Rafale fighter jet. His 
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loyalists scattered as rebels attacked and they ultimately captured and killed Qaddafi. 
This represents a significant departure in tactics from the Kosovo campaign. This can be 
partly ascribed to differences in regime type as Qaddafi’s Libya was built around his 
personality and philosophy, whereas Serbia had institutions that persisted through the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. This did not represent a decapitation strategy because 
Qaddafi was a target of opportunity and does not represent a concerted effort to target his 
person. Also, this further discredits the notion that Libya was conducted purely as a 
humanitarian operation. The objective was, in Libya and Kosovo, to create a situation 
where it would be untenable for Qaddafi and Milosevic to continue ruling. In both cases, 
airpower did that more efficiently than a ground invasion could have been reasonable 
expected to do. 
The categories of weakening and political destabilization that I attribute to 
Milosevic’s capitulation also apply to Qaddafi, but in different ways. Milosevic’s power 
came through cronyism and the support of key families. Qaddafi was legitimized by the 
monopoly on violence and his patronage system as well. But because Qaddafi was using 
the full weight of his military to put down a revolt, weakening the Qaddafi regime, thus 
politically destabilizing it means attacking its military. In both cases, ethnic cleansing 
was the way the states wanted to maintain political control, but Qaddafi was more 
outright about it, which is why his military was the vulnerable target. Also, creating areas 
where the rebellion could use as a springboard for kinetic operations, like Benghazi 
created a political alternative to Qaddafi. The only way to create this alternative was to 
attack Qaddafi’s strength, his military.  
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The first task at hand was destroying Qaddafi’s anti-aircraft capabilities because 
once this happened, then combat air patrols against ground forces could be conducted 
with impunity.196 Protecting Benghazi and these strike missions, although military in 
nature, served to destabilize Qaddafi because he no longer had the sole claim of 
legitimacy. Targets of priority included attacking Qaddafi’s aircraft to prevent them from 
striking against the rebel cities and hitting any forces maneuvering on Benghazi.197 The 
political parameters were in flux amongst the other NATO members, so the primary 
target was the military, especially “mechanized forces, artillery, mobile surface-to-air 
missile sites, interdicting their lines of communications their command and control and 
any opportunities for sustainment of that activity.”198 For NATO, it was easy politically 
to for a battle plan around targeting his military.  
Civilian infrastructure was left off the target list because it would not affect 
Qaddafi in any way. He had his own infrastructure and he controlled the state. There was 
also no need to further stir dissent amongst the population at large, unlike the Milosevic 
regime. In this way, targeting the military, which would be categorized as denial, really 
represents political destabilization. 
Mueller concludes that the US/NATO air campaign enabled the rebels to survive 
Qaddafi’s initial assault and then airpower allowed the rebels to go on the offensive. It 
also encouraged them to unite against Qaddafi. The mission had a mandate to protect 
civilians, but the fact that US/NATO forces first target military assets revealed that the 
                                                 
196 Mueller, 123 
197 Mueller, 125 
198 Mueller, 129 
 89 
mission was viewed as an opportunity to take out Qaddafi and change the political order 
of the region. Mueller is wrong that the mission is about humanitarianism because the 
events surrounding Qaddafi’s death demonstrate otherwise. Some may try and create a 
“Libyan Model” and equate it with the Afghan Model. Yes, there was synergy between 
indigenous ground forces and airpower, but no American or allied personnel were 
involved on the ground. Most of the targeting was done on an ad-hoc basis at the Air 
Force Targeting Center or US airbases around the continental US. 199  
Conclusions about the Operations 
Although Operation Odyssey Dawn featured 100% use of precision guided 
munitions whereas Operation Allied Force in Kosovo featured only 29%, this does not 
mean that Libya was more effective, but rather those are the only munitions in Western 
military stockpiles now and when the political mandate is to protect civilians, using 
unguided bombs clearly runs counter to that and could have opened the operation to 
criticism. Airpower in both cases was not about humanitarian principles, but about 
regional order. Because both campaigns forced the leaders out of power, they ought to be 
categorized as limited successes, not victories. A victory implies that the politics of the 
situation changed so rapidly and that the result was formed a new political reality that 
satisfies the victor in every measure. I categorize each operation as a success because 
they set out to change the political realities of the situation on the ground because 
anything would be preferable to their retention of power.  
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The merits of intervening in Libya can be debated given the continuing civil 
strife, but that precludes the possibility it also could reflect the situation in Syria. Nation-
states have far greater capacity to organize and wage war than non-state actors do, which 
is why the Obama Administration took the risk of going after Qaddafi.  
In neither case did airpower “win” on its own. Rather it was used to alter the 
political realities of the adversaries, which then opened them to challenges from political 
rivals. The cases are similar because they both coerced their targets by targeting their 
reasons for having power. For Milosevic, it was that he made important families wealthy 
and once he endangered them, this endangered his rule. Qaddafi always had the military 
and coercive state to repress any political challenger, but once that was gone he became 
vulnerable. I argue that when airpower is being used against an established nation-state, it 
should be targeting whatever will politically destabilize the adversarial regime. 
For example, if a regime claims it holds a revolutionary group at bay, then the 
military should be target. This does not fit under the category of denial because it is not 
about reshaping another state’s military objectives, but rather stripping away that political 
claim. If a state needs to export a product to remain economically viable, then the means 
of distribution should be attacked, like airstrips and ports. This can be done without 
civilian casualties and within the laws of war. Furthermore, the categories of coercion 
that Lake proposes ought to be reorganized under political destabilization with all other 
categories flowing from it, because as demonstrated in Kosovo and Libya, the only way 
politics change is if the political underpinning of the regime is attacked. This also 
achieves the important synergy of airpower because it is not bombing just to bomb, but it 
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effects the strategy of the adversary. Once again, the Clausewitzian adage that war is 
politics by other means rings true. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions About Airpower in American Foreign Policy 
and International Relations 
As a political and military strategy, particularly in the American context, airpower 
has a place in the toolkit of American foreign policy. Airpower works, but it needs some 
synergy with some ground force to exploit, be it a political force or a military one. 
Merely dispatching cruise missiles or bombers does not create political change on its 
own.  
The recent cruise missile strike against Shayrat Airfield in Syria demonstrates this 
well. Merely bombing Assad’s airfields will not end the conflict because there are larger 
political forces in play, but if airstrikes were part of a comprehensive strategy, then 
results will be more impressive. Also, the recent use of the GBU-43 Massive Ordinance 
Air Blast Bomb, or MOAB in Afghanistan may have killed dozens of self-proclaimed 
Islamic State fighters, but it does not address the core political issues that fester in 
Afghan/ISAF politics. Moreover, it deals a limited blow to a terror network known for 
resiliency.  
Drones could benefit from a clear strategic outline and an espionage network that 
gives operators a better picture of who to target. In conventional situations in 
Afghanistan, airpower created an impossible choice when it was combined with special 
forces and indigenous allies. In Kosovo and Libya, it changed Milosevic and Qaddafi’s 
regimes because it undermined particular pieces of their political base of support. Each 
case also had a clear political imperative to act. The objective of drone strike is to chip 
away at terror networks, like al-Qaeda. The War in Afghanistan was about striking back 
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at the perpetrators and abettors of 9/11. The campaigns in Kosovo and Libya were 
legitimized under the auspices of humanitarian principles, but were really opportunities to 
alter regional order. 
To a certain extent, the theory about airpower as a political and military strategy 
is trapped in the past. International relations is focused on conflict, as it should be 
because war it is the most deadly and transformative force known to mankind. Too often 
history and its lessons are taken as scripture and the lessons of the past are strictly applied 
to the present when they may not apply at all. Theorists like Billy Mitchell and Gulio 
Douchet are the modern origins that airpower can render ground forces secondary and 
bring an enemy, particularly an enemy nation-state, to its knees in relatively short order. 
It is attractive to American policy makers because it makes war more sanitary and 
humane, but as demonstrated in the drone campaign in North Waziristan, it can be 
anything but.  
Alone, airpower cannot win wars or deliver positive outcomes. As Clausewitz has 
written, “war is the contest of wills”. For every strategy, there is a counter-strategy and 
Kosovo demonstrates this point well because not every adversary or political opponent of 
the United States wants to fight on our terms. The United States is the lone superpower in 
the world with the most experienced and advanced military in human history. No rational 
state or non-state group would want to engage the US in a conventional struggle. 
Airpower theory comes from a time when conflict was viewed only through the 
perspective of nation-states in a struggle for power, but the overarching geopolitical 
landscape has drastically changed. First, the US remains the predominant global power 
and the nature and conduct of war has changed as a result. War and conflict have moved 
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away from the affairs of states because international order is, overall, relatively stable, 
but there are certain states and groups that do not have any political interest in the current 
structure. At least part of the reason some have pointed to airpower as a strategy as an 
ineffective because terror cells or defiant regimes lack the infrastructure or large military 
apparatus to target. This is especially true for terror networks as their centers of gravity 
are relationships between people. These new states and actors do not neatly fit into the 
categories that exist. That is why I argue airpower alone cannot succeed, but when it has 
synergy to exploit, it can work. 
Furthermore, there is a widely-held belief that the next technological 
advancement is always a few years away that will force the enemy to change. It is not 
admitting failure or defeat by trying a new strategy. In fact, thinking outside of accepted 
norms can create controlled chaos and when one side is in front of the chaos, he can 
harness it to shape the outcome according to a particular vision.  
Political power is inherently decided by people. During the Blitz, one of the most 
fearsome aerial bombardments in human history, merely attacking civilians did not bend 
the will of the British because it was a political struggle and the British people had a clear 
political imperative to act. They were fighting for survival and a future, but the German 
bombardment was more detached from a grand strategy. Yes, it was part of the plan for 
world domination and the potential invasion of Britain, but it was bombing with the hope 
of changing the mind of the average Englishman. The Blitz did not have a clear objective 
to accomplish. In the 21st century, when the boundary between civilian and soldier, war 
and peace, is even more blurred, airpower and military objectives need clear parameters 
and objectives. 
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The subject of airpower has gained an increased salience given the rise of the self-
proclaimed Islamic State’s rapid advance across parts of Iraq and Syria. Airpower has 
captured the attention of Americans even more recently with President Trump’s 
authorization to strike Shayrat Airfield in Syria. The use of airpower, has the potential to 
drastically alter the US-Russian relationship and perhaps change the nature of American 
military involvement in the conflict. A miscalculation or accident has the potential to set 
off the geopolitical powder keg that is the Syrian civil war. The discussion about 
airpower matters, it cannot be viewed as a solution to any political problem because, as 
demonstrated in Syria, a mistake can start a war.  
There is no clear path that the cases I discuss lay out for guidance on dealing with 
IS, but they do have valuable lessons to heed. First, airpower alone cannot win this battle. 
Airpower can change political realities, like the ability of a regime to assuage supporters 
and accomplish certain objectives like crushing political dissent, but there needs to be 
another force to synergize with to take advantage of the battlefield conundrum of 
concentrating to fight or spreading out to avoid aerial bombardment. Also, allies do not 
always share the same political vision as the US. Therefore, relying only on allies to 
defeat IS will not bear fruit and the region will continue to be unsettled. The introduction 
of special forces and other American troops on the ground may invoke thoughts about 
recycling the Afghan Model, but that would not produce a similar result. The political 
situation on the ground is much less clear-cut than it was in early 2001. Also, IS and 
other groups have been pushed back and are beginning to use insurgency tactics as they 
lose territory. Broadly, airpower should be used to continue to whittle away at their 
combat power because they cannot replace their losses in men, materiel or expertise. 
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Airpower is a valuable tool in American foreign policy, as it allows the US to 
make a statement around the globe in a matter of hours, but it should not be wielded 
without a comprehensive strategic vision and a plan to accompany its use. The use of 
airpower should not be treated lightly or as a bloodless war because it can be the opening 
stages of a larger military commitment that may not be advisable. Also, technology itself 
cannot be expected to solve the strategic puzzle. In conclusion, airpower has changed an 
important aspect of international relations, how conflict is conducted. War is the most 
destructive and transformative human activity and airpower is an important aspect of 
conflict in the 21st century, so it is crucial to understand airpower. 
 
